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ACQUIRE THEM. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TOOK 
QUESTIONABLE STEPS BY SUBMITTING HIS FIRST 
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LATER WITH NEW GROUNDS FOR FEES THAT WERE ALSO 
UNTENABLE. 
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AWARD DEFENDANT FEES ON THE APPEAL AND REMAND 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The trial court erred in awarding Plaintiff's counsel 
attorney fees where the only cause of action was an open account, 
with no written contract nor statute plead nor appropriate to 
justify such fees. 
Standard of review. The basic entitlement to fees is an issue 
of law to be determined without deference to the trial court. 
Robertson v Gem Ins. Co, 828 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1992); Hiaains v. 
Salt Lake City, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
2. Defendants contend Plaintiff's counsel committed fraud on 
the court by filing false sworn affidavits to obtain fees to which 
he knew he was not entitled as a matter of fact and law. While 
some deference may be given to the lower court's specific 
determinations, the issue of fraud by its nature, the reviewing 
court essentially reviews the record, and certainly the law, 
without deference to the lower court. 
Citation to the record showing that the issue is preserved in 
the trial court. Defendants raised the issues of no right to fees 
and fraud on the court in the first pleadings in opposition 
to the original judgment entered by Judge Maurice V. Jones February 
15, 1991 (R. 152-178) and all subsequent pleadings. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
14-2-2. FAILURE OF OWNER TO OBTAIN PAYMENT BONDS - LIABILITY. 
Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to all 
persons who perform labor or have supplied materials under the 
contract for the reasonable value of the labor performed or 
materials furnished. No action to recover on such liability may 
commence after the expiration of one year after the date of which 
the last of the labor was performed or the material was supplied by 
such person. 
78-27-56 Attorney's fees - Awarded where action or bad faith. 
In civil action, where not otherwise provided by statute or 
agreement, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
deference to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith. 
78-51-26 Duties of attorneys and counselors. 
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor: 
(1) To support the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States and of this state; 
(2) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and 
judicial officers; 
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(3) To counsel or maintain no other action, proceeding or 
defense than that which appears to him legal and just, excepting 
the defense of a person charged with a public offense; 
(4) To employ for the purposes of maintaining the causes 
confided to him such means only as are consistent with truth, and 
never to seek to mislead the judges by any artifice or false 
statement of fact or law; 
(5) To maintain inviolate the confidences, and at every peril 
to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client; 
(6) To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance 
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a 
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he 
is charged; 
(7) Not to encourage either the commencement or continuance of 
an action or proceeding from any corrupt motive or passion or 
interest; 
(8) Never to reject for any consideration personal to himself 
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed; and 
(9) To comply with all duly approved rules and regulations 
prescribed by the board of commissioners of the Utah state bar and 
to pay the fees provided by law." 
vii 
Rule 3*3• Candor Toward the Tribunal. 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law 
to a tribunal; 
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal 
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by the client; 
(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority 
in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be 
directly adverse to the position of the client and not 
disclosed by opposing counsel; or 
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and 
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable remedial measures. 
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the 
conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance 
requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 
1.6. 
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
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(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the 
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will 
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or 
not the facts are adverse. 
Rule 3.3 - COMMENT 
Representations by a Lawyer 
An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents 
prepared for litigation, but is usually not reguired to have 
personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation 
documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by 
someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. 
Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion supporting to be on the 
lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a 
statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer 
knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis 
of reasonably diligent inguiry. There are circumstances where 
failure to make a disclosure is the eguivalent of an affirmative 
misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(c) not to 
counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a 
fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 
1.2(c), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 
8.4(b). 
ix 
Misleading Legal Argument 
Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of 
law constitutes dishonesty toward a tribunal. A lawyer is not 
required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must 
recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. 
Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty 
to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the opposing party. 
The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion 
seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the 
case. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions* 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented 
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record 
in his individual name who is duly licensed to practice in the 
state of Utah. The attorney's address also shall be stated. A 
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his 
pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except 
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings 
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in 
equity that the averments of an answer accompanied by 
x 
affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of 
one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification 
by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that 
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called 
to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, 
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of a reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
XI 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff as assignee of Main Street Electric, sued Sorensen 
Construction on a $944 claim for electrical goods supplied for 
Sorensen to use at the Caine home which it was building. Sorensen 
answered, claiming set-off as Main Street owed Sorensen $1300 for 
defective goods it had supplied at another home. (Ex 11,12,13,) 
Defendant's counsel failed to see that in back of Plaintiff's 
pleadings was a hidden Demand for Admissions. The trial court gave 
Plaintiff judgment for Defendant's failure to answer the Demand for 
Admissions. The Complaint was on an open account. Plaintiff's 
lawyer then submitted to the Court, without submitting them first 
to opposing counsel, a judgment awarding him $2,700 in fees, and 
his client 18% interest, when no contract existed to justify them. 
Plaintiff's counsel did this by stating three false grounds, 
Contractor's Bond Statute, written contract, and 70A-2-201 et seq, 
UCA. Plaintiff's counsel subsequently submitted new grounds to 
justify fees when his first grounds were proved false. The case 
went through four judges. First Judge Paul Grant denied 
Plaintiff's motion. On Judge Grant recusing himself, Judge Jones 
reversed him and granted Plaintiff's motion for judgment on 
Plaintiff's Demands for Admissions. Judge Jones never awarded fees 
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in Bench Rulings, but signed two judgments providing for them. 
Judge Jones retired and Judge Dennis Fuchs took over to hear a 
motion pending, but not heard by Judge Jones, to vacate the 
judgments. Judge Fuchs refused to consider the matter or revisit 
the issues, and granted additional fees to Plaintiff's counsel. 
Plaintiff's counsel filed a Writ of Mandate in the Third District 
Court, Judge David S. Young. Judge Young returned the matter to 
Judge Fuchs to specifically examine all issues in the case. On 
rehearing before Judge Fuchsr he refused to do so and awarded 
Plaintiff more fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This appeal is from a final judgment in the Circuit Court in 
favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, Neil Sorensen 
Construction and Russell Sorensen dated April 13, 1996 by Judge 
Dennis J. Fuchs, and related prior orders of Judge Jones and Judge 
Fuchs, and from the proceeding orders. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case is about Plaintiff's attorney. He committed 
perjury in order to get fees in an open account case and the trial 
court failed to deal with him. There has been no evidentiary 
hearing of any kind. 
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2. Accordingly this case is defined entirely by the 
pleadings and Orders in the file, together with transcript of 
hearing before Judge Dennis Fuchs. As law and fact are 
inextricably intertwined, to explain the facts some reference to 
law must be made. 
3. In 1989 Main Street Lighting, Inc., Plaintiff's 
predecessor, supplied electrical fixtures to the job sites for two 
homes being built by the Defendant Sorensen Construction, 
(Sorensen). These were the Cindy Caine (Caine) home and the George 
Stavros home. 
4. Sorensen signed no contract for either order. Instead, 
Main Street left itemized receipts when it delivered the goods. 
These receipts had no provision for fees nor interest. As such 
they were "open accounts." 
5. The goods delivered for Cindy Caine were suitable. Their 
value was $947.44. The delivery receipt shows they were delivered 
April 4, 1989 (Ex. 4). It is unsigned. It has no provision for 
fees, nor 18% interest. It is the only written contract between 
Plaintiff and Sorensen Construction relating to the Caine home. 
6. The fixtures delivered to the Stavros home were 
defective, but Sorensen had already paid Main Street for them. 
7. Main Street did not replace the Stavros fixtures leading 
Sorensen to write, on July 20, 1989, its letter to Main Street in 
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which Sorensen told Main Street that it could either supply 
adequate goods, or Sorensen would obtain goods from another source 
and set those off against the money it owed Main Street for Caine. 
(Ex 11) 
8. Main Street not having responded, on August 10, 1989 
Sorensen wrote again to Main Street stating they had to purchase 
comparable equipment for $1,375, deducted the $947.44 owed Main 
Street for Caine, leaving a balance Main Street owed Sorensen of 
$42 7.56. Sorensen stated, "We are not asking for reimbursement of 
this money, just that this matter is ended." (Ex 12) 
9. Main Street's corporate charter to do business was 
suspended by the state of Utah in June, 1990. Main Street and 
Plaintiff, Ivie Electric, Inc. were both owned by Brent Ivie. 
Contrary to law in which an insolvent corporation may not dispose 
of its assets without consideration, Main Street transferred 
without consideration to Ivie Electric its claim against Sorensen 
for the Caine bill. 
10. The next month in July, 1990, with Main Street being out 
of business and so not fiscally responsible to pay for Stavros, 
Ivie Electric sued Sorensen Construction for $947.44 on the Caine 
matter on an "open account" claim, and also sued its president, 
Russell Sorensen as individually responsible for Sorensen 
Construction. The Complaint (Ex 1, |4) had no allegation of fact 
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other than the conclusionary statement that he operated it as his 
alter ego. Plaintiff also sued Russell Sorensen as an individual 
for $65 in electrical material he had ordered privately (a bad 
claim as his canceled check in the Circuit Court file shows he had 
paid this) (Ex. 1, Count 4), and also sued the home owner Cindy 
Caine under quantum meruit and the Contractor's Bond Statute. (Ex 
1, Counts 2&3) The complaint also referred in Count 4 to an 
"attached note" which impliedly provided for fees and 18% interest. 
The note was not attached. It was signed by Russell Sorensen when 
he purchased for himself $65 worth of electrical supplies (Ex 14). 
It has different dates, amounts goods and parties than the coin 
receipt. It has no provision for fees or 18% interest. Each cause 
of action of the Complaint ended with a request for attorney fees 
and 18% annual interest, but stated no facts or law to justify 
their award. 
11. Annexed at the back of the complaint were pages of 
interrogatories. These required very detailed answers. A glance 
at them showed a full response would cost Sorensen more than the 
$900 claimed. Included was a demand for admissions. 
12. Assuming Plaintiff's attorney, Brian Steffensen, was not 
familiar with the previous correspondence, Defendant's counsel 
filed an Answer to protect Defendants, and wrote a letter to Mr. 
Steffensen explaining the situation and suggesting the complaint be 
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dismissed. (Ex 12) He included the previous letters to Main Street 
(Ex 11,12), and submitted a stipulation for voluntary dismissal, 
13. Defense counsel, Samuel King, did not see the Demand for 
Admissions. It asked Defendants to admit the complaint's 
allegations as to liability and fees were true. Had Mr King seen 
it, he would have answered as the responses would have been easy 
"denies." 
14. Rather than replying, Mr. Steffensen counted down 30 
days, then filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that 
Defendant's failure to answer the demands for admissions was a 
basis for judgment for Plaintiff. 
15. Plaintiff's motion came before Judge Paul Grant who 
denied it. 
16. In so acting, Judge Grant was entirely correct. Brunetti 
v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555 (Utah App. 1993) is a case where Mr. 
Steffensen used precisely the same tactics of a hidden Demand for 
Admissions, moved for judgment based on the same error of opposing 
counsel overlooking the demands for admissions, appealed the 
decision of Judge Palmer identical to Judge Grant's, and lost on 
his appeal. The Court of Appeals held that annexing a Demand for 
Admissions to the back of the complaint without identifying them 
was improper and inadequate notice to the opposing party so as to 
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trigger the strict requirements for failure to answer Demands for 
Admissions pursuant to Rule 36 (a). U.R.C.P. 
17. In Voir Dire, an article dealt with judges discussing 
lawyers "dirty tricks.11 Judge Daniels cited hiding Demands for 
Admissions in other pleadings as a prime example of a dirty trick. 
18. The Mascaro decision had not been announced at the time 
Judge Jones ruled. However in Mascaro, Judge Palmer, on the same 
Circuit Court as Judge Jones, had denied Mr. Steffensen's Motion 
for Judgment six months before Mr. Steffensen tried the ploy before 
Judge Jones. Mr Steffensen had, and breached, a duty to advise 
Judge Jones of this precedent set by his brother Judge. 
19. Judge Grant then recused himself after officiating at the 
wedding of one of defense counsel's children. 
20. Judge Maurice Jones then became Judge and entered a bench 
ruling reversing Judge Grant and awarded Plaintiff judgment based 
on the unanswered Demand for Admissions. He awarded no fees. 
21. Plaintiff's attorney then submitted a judgment to Judge 
Jones without first submitting it to Defendant's counsel. Judge 
Jones entered it before defense had seen it. He signed it February 
15, 1991, and its mailing date to defense was February 13, 1991. 
This "Judgment" is a remarkable document. (Ex. 2) It did not cover 
the facts nor law on which Judge Jones' Order was based. Instead 
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it is entirely a detailed accounting of fees and interest granted 
to Plaintiff. 
22. Judge Jones signed the judgment granting Plaintiff $946 
principal, 18% annual interest and $2,783.15 in fees. This award 
of fees was based on Mr. Steffensen's accompanying affidavit (Ex. 
3) swearing he was entitled to fees on each of three separate 
grounds: (1) a written contract providing for them, (2) the 
Contractor's Bond Statute, and (3) the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Sections. "70A-2-201,et seq." 
22. Mr. Steffensen, at the same time, obtained a separate and 
identical judgment against Cindy Caine for $946 and the same fees, 
interest and costs (Ex. 13). 
23. Defendants filed a motion before Judge Jones to set aside 
the judgments arguing in their motion: 
A. As soon as their counsel received from 
Plaintiff's counsel the delivery receipt, which made no 
provision for fees nor interest and was not signed, he 
immediately filed the answer to Demands for Admissions. 
Until that time, as the complaint \^as based on a note which 
hadn't been annexed, this was timely as Rule 36(a), U.R.C.P. 
requires all documents referred to in Demands for Admissions 
must be submitted before a response is due, and also there was 
no prejudice to Plaintiff. [Rule 36(b)] 
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B. Mr. Steffensen's affidavit was false as (1) there is 
no written contract with Sorensen Construction providing for 
fees nor 18% interest. (Mr. Steffensen admitted this in later 
pleadings when he was challenged to produce such a document 
and could not do so.) (2) The Contractor's Bond Statute gave 
a contractor one year in which to use the statute, and 
Plaintiff's complaint was time barred as it was filed fifteen 
months after the goods were delivered, and (3) the UCC 
provisions he cited in his affidavit made no provisions for 
fees under the case facts, nor did he refer to the UCC in his 
complaint. 
C. Defendants argued Mr. Steffensen's affidavit 
constituted fraud on the Court as he had only an open account 
case for which fees are not awarded as a matter of law, that 
he obviously knew this as he never sought fees based on the 
open account so, not for his client, but solely for his own 
illegal gain, he invented three blatantly false theories to 
give himself money from the pockets of citizens who had 
neither liability in the first place nor any obligation to pay 
fees under any legitimate theory of law, and who also had no 
obligation to pay interest at 18% per annum. 
NOTE: The term for a lawyer who does this is 
"pettifogger," a term Brigham Young often used when he 
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mentioned lawyers. A "pettifogger" is defined as a lawyer who 
(1) pursues a claim without merit, (2) against people without 
fault, (3) in order to enrich himself. This is mentioned as 
the "pettifogger" concept illuminates what this case is about. 
D. If a party is defaulted, the other party, according 
to Utah case law, could not "take a free ride" at the expense 
of the other party (Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982), but could recover based 
only on the facts, not the conclusions, of the complaint, and 
then only for the relief justified by the law based on the 
facts stated in the complaint so that Ivie had no right to 
fees, nor 18% interest, and any judgment against Russell 
Sorensen based on an undetailed alter ego claim was also 
unjustified. Also suit against Russell for his personal 
$65.00 purchase (Ex. 1) was also unfounded as he paid it. His 
cancelled check was annexed. 
E. That no judgment against Cindy Caine was proper as 
the one year statutory limit to assert a claim against her 
under the Contractor's Bond Statutes had passed before the 
complaint was filed. The Complaint was dated in December, 
1989. If filed then, eight months after delivery of the 
electrical equipment, the Contractor's Bond Statute would have 
applied, but Mr. Steffensen chose to let that Cause of Action 
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expire while he waited for the State to forfeit Main Street's 
corporate license so it wouldn't exist to respond to the 
counterclaim. Rather than deleting Ms. Caine from the 
complaint he sued her anyway. Mr. Steffensen to justify an 
award of fees based on the Contractor's Bond Statute swore 
that he "had read the Statute and the cases construing it" 
(Ex. 3, fl5) and this justified fees under that Statute. That 
Statute expressly gave the right to fees in section 14-2-2 
U.C.A. and then in the very same section limits the right only 
to claims filed within one year. That is, if Mr. Steffensen 
swore to the truth in his affidavit that he had read the 
Contractor's Bond Statute, then at the time he filed his fee 
affidavit, he knew he had no right to fees under it. 
24. Judge Jones set aside the judgment against defendant 
Caine. She is not involved in this appeal. He affirmed the 
judgment against Sorensen Construction and Russell Sorensen. 
25. Mr. Steffensen then submitted an order to Judge Jones for 
his signature. (Ex. 5) No "judgment" was included in the title of 
that order. At its last paragraph, it awarded Mr. Steffensen 
"judgment" for total fees of $3,875.00. This order also was not 
first submitted to defense. 
26. Defendants filed an objection to that order because Judge 
Jones commented that he had intended to award no additional fees 
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and that he had not seen they were hidden at the end of the Order. 
Sorensen asked again that all judgments in favor of Ivie be set 
aside under the case circumstances. They reasonably hoped that 
Judge Jones, now privy to Mr. Steffensen's conduct, would set all 
judgments aside. 
27. Sorensen's motion was set for hearing before Judge Jones, 
but he retired before hearing it. Judge Fuchs was assigned the 
case. 
28. At argument before Judge Fuchs on Defendant's objections 
in October 1992, Judge Fuchs declined to revisit the issues and 
denied them relief. He erred in this as the last Judgment signed 
by Judge Jones had not been reviewed so Judge Fuchs, as successor 
Judge, stood in the shoes of Judge Jones, and had both power and 
duty to review that last Order for correctness. Rule 63(a), URCP 
29. Defendants then waited for an order from Judge Fuchs, as 
he had directed, from the bench, to be submitted to them by Mr. 
Steffensen. 
30. Without notice to Defendants in December 1992, Mr. 
Steffensen submitted to Judge Fuchs a judgment awarding him prior 
fees and additional $1,601.50 in attorney fees. The Order makes no 
reference to Judge Fuchs nor to the hearing before him (Ex. 6). It 
was prepared for signature by Judge Jones. Mr. Steffensen 
apparently prepared it in anticipation of the matter being heard 
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before Judge Jones as its mailing certificate is May 1992, five 
months before Judge Fuchs' hearing. Judge Fuchs signed it even 
though it was prepared for Judge Jones, had detailed findings that 
Judge Fuchs had declined to make, made no reference to his actual 
ruling that he declined to "revisit the issues," (Ex. 8, Docket 
10/5/92) and awarded fees even though he had made no fee award. 
The Order awarded fees to Mr. Steffensen based on a finding that 
"written agreements" between the parties provided for them. This 
is a new ground for fees. As Defendant's challenge to Mr. 
Steffensen's first three grounds for fees was obviously well taken, 
Mr. Steffensen has since abandoned them and used a number of new 
grounds such as plural "written agreements" and "the Law of 
Merchants." None of these are in the original complaint and none 
are supportable. Being faced with the fact that his first fee 
affidavit was proved false, instead of acknowledging he has no 
right to fees, Mr. Steffensen burns the midnight oil to invent new 
grounds. 
31. Defendants applied to Judge Fuchs for an ex parte order 
for stay of execution asking that he revisit the issues and set the 
judgments aside. This was heard January 13, 1994. 
32. Judge Fuchs again declined to revisit the issues stating 
if Sorensen didn't like his ruling, he could appeal. When Mr. King 
asked the court to Have Mr. Steffensen produce the "written 
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agreements" he referred to in the order the court had signed, it 
declined to have Mr.Steffensen respond. 
33. Mr. Steffensen's apparent obsession with profit for 
himself led him on two occasions, December 10, 1993 and May 18, 
1995, to file two "amended judgments," which he signed and entered 
himself in his own name without bothering the Court (Ex. 9). Mr. 
Steffensen then sent the sheriff out to execute on each of his 
"amended judgments" with the execution based on those higher 
figures, not lower court figures. 
34. It is monstrous that an attorney, based on his 
intentionally false fee affidavits, has bootstrapped himself into 
over $20,000 in attorney fees in a case where he knows there is no 
written contract nor statutory authority in support of it. For the 
court to approve such judgments is a flagrant abuse of its 
discretion. 
35. Defense counsel was reluctant to take an appeal on a 
$900.00 claim. The time of the appellate Court is more valuable 
than that, and the cost and time to the Defendants is excessive. 
At the same time the fees could not be paid as a matter of right 
and wrong. 
36. Accordingly on January 28, 1994 Defendants filed a 
Petition for Mandamus in the Third District Court. This was filed 
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under Rule 65(d), URCP, providing for such a writ where an inferior 
Court has grossly abused its discretion. 
37. The matter was assigned to Judge David Young, who issued 
the Writ of Mandamus. Before it was heard Mr. Steffensen again 
tried to execute on Defendants assets. Defendants appeared before 
Judge Fuchs for relief as the Writ of Mandate expressly stayed 
execution until the Writ was heard. Judge Fuchs' stopped the 
execution and, in his Order dated July 14, 1995, he expressly 
stated that if Judge Young referred the matter back to him, he 
would rule on all issues. Relying on Judge Fuchs commitment, Judge 
Young declined to hear the writ himself, but returned the case back 
to Judge Fuchs adding express instructions that Judge Fuchs was to 
determine whether or not Mr. Steffensen had any right to fees. 
38. At scheduling hearing before Judge Fuchs he indicated 
that he would obey Judge Young and determine if Mr. Steffensen had 
any right to fees. 
39. Argument was heard before Judge Fuchs February 1, 1996. 
At that hearing Judge Fuchs (A) refused to consider fraud on the 
court, held Mr. Steffensen was entitled to fees, and affirmed all 
the previous orders of the Circuit Court, (B) refused to comply 
with the instructions of Judge Young, (C) refused to comply with 
his own commitment that he would re-examine fees, (D) ordered 
Defendant's counsel to present no further pleadings in his Court 
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but to take the matter on appeal if he was dissatisfied, and (E) 
awarded Mr. Steffensen additional fees for the hearing. (Hearing 
transcript in record but not paginated at P.5 L10-17, P.37 L 3-22, 
P. 39 L6-8, P. 41 Ll-5) Judge Fuchs specifically declined to 
comment on the fact that in the pleadings submitted to him for that 
hearing Mr. Steffensen abandoned all previous grounds for fees and 
came up with a new cluster of grounds none supported by the 
complaint or any prior pleadings. 
40. Judge Fuchs final order was signed April 15, 1996 and 
notice of appeal was filed May 10, 1996. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RECOGNIZING THAT HIS "OPEN ACCOUNT" COMPLAINT GAVE HIM NO 
BASIS FOR FEES BUT WISHING TO ACQUIRE THEM, PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL 
TOOK QUESTIONABLE STEPS BY SUBMITTING HIS FIRST PROPOSED JUDGMENT 
TO THE COURT WITHOUT FIRST SUBMITTING IT TO DEFENSE SO THEY WOULD 
HAVE NO OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT AND SUBMITTING HIS SWORN "FEE 
AFFIDAVIT" TO THE COURT WHICH ASKED FOR FEES NOT ON OPEN ACCOUNT, 
BUT ON THREE OTHER GROUNDS, NONE OF WHICH WERE TENABLE AND, ON 
THOSE GROUNDS BEING CHALLENGED, COMING UP LATER WITH NEW GROUNDS 
FOR FEES THAT WERE ALSO UNTENABLE. 
Standard of Review. As the matters raised are errors of law 
made by the trial court as to the right to fees, review is of 
propriety of those rulings, so no deference is accorded the trial 
court. Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co, 828 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1992) 
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Judge Jones' Bench Ruling (Docket, Ex. 8, January 29, 1991) 
stated only that Plaintiff's motion for judgment based on 
Defendant's failure to timely answer "Demands for Admissions" was 
granted and no fees were awarded. 
On February 15, 1991, Judge Jones signed the judgment on his 
ruling (Ex. 2). 
The judgement's mailing certificate shows that it was mailed 
to defense February 13, 1991, so it was still in the mail when the 
judgment was entered. This violates Rule 4-504(2), UCJA, which 
requires proposed judgements be mailed to opposing counsel at least 
five days before being submitted to the court. 
With the judgement, defense counsel, Mr. Steffensen, submitted 
his sworn fee affidavit (Ex. 3), stating he was entitled to fees on 
three separate grounds: (1) 14-2-2 UCA (Contractor's Bond 
Statute), (2) 70A-2-201 UCA (Commercial Code), and (3) a written 
contract. 
In apparent reliance on the probity of counsel, Judge Jones 
signed the judgment. 
In so doing, Judge Jones might have been acting on the concept 
stated in Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1985), which held 
that as an attorney is an officer of the court, the court can 
properly "...repose confidence in him for truth and candor." Judge 
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Jones reliance might also have been based on concepts such as Rule 
3.3(d), Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides: 
"In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the 
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which 
will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, 
whether or not the facts are adverse." 
In point of fact the judgment (Ex. 2) and fee affidavit (Ex. 
3) had the following defects: 
1. The issue before Judge Jones had been whether or not 
Defendant should be defaulted for the failure to timely answer 
Demands for Admissions. He ruled only that they should be. 
The proposed judgment does not, at a glance, set out the facts 
on which Judge Jones arrived at that decision, nor the applicable 
law. It awards fees not previously submitted to the opposition. 
Accordingly, the judgment runs counter to Embassy Group v. 
Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366 (Utah App. 1993) which states findings: 
"... Must be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each fact in issue was reached." 
The judgment patently fails to do so. 
2. The judgment awards Plaintiff fees not awarded in the 
Bench Ruling (Ex. 6). 
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3. The Complaint (Ex 1) states only an open account claim, 
i.e. : 
"6. Defendant Sorensen entered into an agreement 
with Main Street to provide electrical materials to the 
Caine property. 
7. Main Street provided said materials to the 
Defendants for which the amount of $947.44 is owing as of 
April 4, 1989. 
8. Defendants have failed to pay the balance due 
of $947.44. 
9. The principal due and owing for materials 
provided by Main Street to Defendants is $947.44 together 
with interest at 18% per annum from April 4, 1989 until 
paid in full, court costs and reasonable attorney fees." 
(Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex. 1 fl6-9) 
The Complaint thus states a succinct open account cause of 
action, but the last lines of |9 asking for fees and 18% interest 
is conclusionary as the Complaint states no facts, no contract, nor 
statute on which to base a right in Plaintiff to receive fees. 
That is, asking for an award does not by itself create a right to 
it. Justifying facts are required. 
"Utah adheres to the well-established rule that 
attorney fees generally cannot be recovered unless 
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provided for by statute or contract." Turtle Management 
Inc. v. Haaais Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). 
Conclusionary language in a complaint asking for relief not 
justified by the facts plead states no legal basis for an award of 
that relief. Accord Croco v. Oregon-RR Co., 18 Utah 311, 54 P.2d 
985, holding conclusionary statements are not statements of fact, 
so standing alone, fail to state a cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted on a default. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 
1105 (Utah 1982); Quealv v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667 (Utah 1986); 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
Utah Steel and Iron v. Bosch, 25 Utah 85, 475 P.2d 1019, held 
a complaint did not state a cause of action when it did not allege 
the acts of the Defendant with specificity nor connect those acts, 
as a matter of causation, with the conclusions in the complaint. 
Accord, Heathman v. Hatch, 72 P.2d 990 (Utah 1962). 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268, (Utah 1992) 
held fee award must be based on the evidence and law, and be 
supported by Findings of Fact. 
3. At about the same time, Mr. Steffensen took an entirely 
separate default judgment against Cindy Caine. This judgment was 
identical in court costs, interest, and fees as the judgement 
against Sorensen (Ex. 13). 
20 
The judgment against Sorensen awarded Plaintiff $947.44 
principal, service costs of $44.25 and attorney fees of $2,783.15 
and prejudgment interest at 18% for a total of $4,097.90. In 
Plaintiff's judgment against Mrs. Caine it charged the same fees 
and costs. 
Those judgments were separate, so Plaintiff could have, in 
theory, obtained full payment from Sorensen to settle the judgment 
against it, and equal amounts from Mrs. Caine to settle the 
judgment against her. 
As a basic matter, Mr. Steffensen's fees were based on his 
fight to obtain judgment against Sorensen for its failure to timely 
answer his Demands for Admissions. No comparable motion was made 
by him against Mrs. Caine. 
4. The separate judgments against Sorensen and Caine are 
also defective because they include in the judgment against 
Sorensen, service costs on Caine, and in the judgment against 
Caine, service costs on Sorensen. 
5. The supporting fee affidavit also asks fees, stating, 
"...The attorneys in this office spent slightly less than 30 hours 
over the past 20 months and $95.00 per hour in initially attempting 
to negotiate a settlement of this matter prior to the commencement 
of litigation..." (Ex. 3, fl3) 
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Plaintiff's counsel made no prefiling contact with Defendants 
or their counsel. If he had, Defendant's counsel would certainly 
not have written to Plaintiff's counsel at the time he filed the 
Answer to the Complaint, filling Plaintiff's counsel in on the 
background history on the case, proposed that it be dismissed, and 
including a stipulation for such dismissal (Ex. 13). 
As a basic matter, Mr. Steffensen's fees were based on his 
effort to obtain judgment against Sorensen for its failure to 
timely answer its Demands for Admissions. No comparable motion was 
made by Plaintiff against Mrs. Caine, so she had no responsibility 
for fees in connection with that motion. 
In Barnes v. Woods, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1988), Plaintiff sued 
on two theories - contract and fraud. Plaintiff won on contract 
and lost on fraud. Barnes held Plaintiff could recover only those 
fees for the contract and could not recover the fees on the fraud. 
Plaintiff obtained full judgment for fees against Mrs. Caine, 
thus violating the law stated in Barnes. 
The point was also addressed in Turtle Management, supra, 
which held: 
"When a plaintiff has a substantial claim against 
one defendant, he should not have a free ride to assert 
claims against other defendants with the expectation that 
the target defendant will end up paying all attorney 
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fees, even those relating to unsuccessful and perhaps 
frivolous claims." 
The point as to the judgment against Mrs. Caine is now moot 
because when Judge Jones heard Defendant's objections to the 
judgments, he declined to revisit the judgment entered against 
Sorensen, but did set aside the judgment against Mrs. Caine in its 
entirety. That's the reason that she is not a party to this 
appeal. 
The judgment against Mrs. Caine is included here as bearing on 
the mind set of Plaintiff's counsel. 
7. Plaintiff's counsel's "fee affidavit" (Ex. 3) states no 
legal basis for fees. 
As a matter of sound psychology, a person seeking judicial 
relief to which he is not entitled is well advised to get his 
judgment entered before the other side has the opportunity to 
object, as judges know most contested judgments turn out to be 
valid. 
Accordingly, having a judgment entered in one's favor gives a 
certain weight to their argument that the judgment should be 
sustained. 
This point is mentioned because it is extremely doubtful that 
Judge Jones would have entered a fee award if Plaintiff's counsel 
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had been given Defendants a chance to object before the judgment 
was entered. 
8. The interest awarded in the judgment and asked in the 
complaint of 18% per annum is also excessive unless there is 
written contract supporting it, otherwise, the open account rate at 
10% per annum would apply (15-1-1, UCA). As there is no written 
contract, this is an improper padding of Plaintiff's damages. 
9. The affidavit states three grounds to justify Plaintiff's 
right to fees. These are: (1) written bid, (2) Contractor's Bond 
Statute and (3) 70A-2-201 et seq. UCA Commercial Code. 
A. Written bid. The fee affidavit (Ex. 3, fl5) 
says Plaintiff is entitled to fees based on a 
written contract, designated as a "written 
bid," providing for them, stating under oath: 
"The written bid, provided for the 
aforementioned interest and attorney fees." 
No such "written bid" was referred to, nor annexed to the 
Complaint relating to Sorensen Construction (Ex. 1, Count 1). 
No such "written bid" was annexed to the fee affidavit or the 
judgment. 
The reason no "written bid" was annexed to the Complaint, nor 
to the judgment, nor to the fee affidavit, is that it does not 
exist. 
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The sole document referring to the goods Main Street delivered 
to Sorensen for the Caine job is an unsigned delivery invoice which 
has no provisions for fees, nor 18% interest. (Ex. 4) 
As the language in Plaintiff's counsel's fee affidavit is very 
clear that there is a written contract providing for fees, it is 
understandable that Judge Jones apparently relied on that 
representation in granting the fee judgment. Such 
misrepresentation by a lawyer to mislead a judge into awarding 
unjustified relief constitutes fraud on the court. (See Argument, 
Point 2.) 
B. Contractor's Bond Statute 
The affidavit (Ex.3, J[5) also wrongfully sought to justify 
fees on the untenable basis that the Contractor's Bond Statute 
allowed them, the affidavit stating: 
"Plaintiff sued Defendant Cindy Caine under the 
Contractor's Bond Statue. Said statute and the cases 
that construe it require the real owner of the property 
to honor the agreements between a general contractor and 
his subcontractors if the owner did not obtain a payment 
bond protecting the subcontractors." 
As stated in the Complaint (Ex. 1, f7) Main Street delivered 
the electrical fixtures to Sorensen on April 4, 1989. That same 
date is on the delivery invoice. (Ex. 4) 
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The Complaint was filed in July 1990, fifteen months after 
delivery of the goods. 
14-2-2, Utah Code Ann. Contractor's Bond Statute provides: 
"14-2-2. FAILURE OF OWNER TO OBTAIN PAYMENT BOND -
LIABILITY. 
Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is 
liable to all persons who perform labor or have supplied 
materials under the contract for the reasonable value of 
the labor performed or materials furnished. Actions to 
recover on such liability must commence before the 
expiration of one year after the date on which the last 
of the labor was performed or the material was supplied 
by such person." 
The same statute that gave Main Street a claim against Mrs. 
Caine expressly limited that right to one year. As it was a single 
transaction, delivery of goods on April 4, 1989, the year expired 
April 4, 1990. 
As Plaintiff's counsel in his affidavit referred to the 
Contractor's Bond Statue specifically and stated counsel had 
familiarized himself with "the cases that construe it..." he must 
be held familiar with the last sentence of 14-2-2, UCA. 
Again Plaintiff's counsel has stated a plausible reason for 
Judge Jones to award fees, but again Plaintiff's counsel had to be 
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aware that he had no right to reach into Sorensen's pocket to get 
money for his own pocket based on the Contractor's Bond Statute. 
In point of fact, Plaintiff's Complaint is dated in December 
1989. However, Main Street did not lose its state charter to do 
business until June 1990. 
By waiting to file the Complaint until Main Street became 
defunct and so not responsible to answer a counterclaim, 
Plaintiff's counsel let the cause of action under the Contractor's 
Bond Statue run out. 
Due to that, Mrs. Caine shouldn't have been sued at all, just 
as Russell Sorensen shouldn't have been sued either. Under these 
circumstances, for Plaintiff's counsel to swear to the court, in 
order to obtain fees against Mrs. Caine and Sorensen, that the 
Contractor's Bond Statute and the cases construing it authorized 
such fees is attorney misconduct. See Rule 3.3 Disciplinary Rules, 
supra. 
C. U.C.C. The third ground sworn to by Plaintiff's 
counsel justifying fees in his fee affidavit (Ex. 3, fl5) is: 
"Under the Utah U.C.C. S70A-2-201 et seq., the 
written bid and written invoice from Plaintiff's 
predecessor in interest to the general contractor in 
connection with the purchase by the general contractor of 
lighting fixtures or in the agreement of the parties, and 
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is fully enforceable against the buyer of the goods. The 
written bid provided for the aforementioned interest and 
attorney fees. This is basis for Plaintiff's claims for 
interest of 18% and costs and attorney fees from 
Defendant." 
70A-2-201 et. seq. is annexed under Determinative Statutes. 
At a glance of the statute, it shows no basis for an award of fees 
in this case. 
In addition, 70A-2-201 is not mentioned in the Complaint. In 
later rounds of pleadings and orders of the court, facts and law 
were submitted and Plaintiff's counsel tacitly acknowledged that 
his three grounds for fees stated in his fee affidavit were false. 
He did this by inventing new grounds. 
Prior to the last hearing before Judge Fuchs, February 2, 
1996, Defendant's counsel filed his last definitive statement on 
fees titled, "Plaintiff's First Amended Memorandum RE: Prior 
Actions and Rulings Regarding Interest and Attorney Fees" stating 
on page four of that Memorandum: 
"Plaintiff filed its objection thereto on April 11, 1991 
(Ex. C-2). In this pleading plaintiff set forth in 
detail: (1) Two statutory basis' for attorney fees (a) 
the UCC relating to transactions between merchants, (b) 
UCC 58-55-16 which provided that general contractors who 
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do not pay subcontractors after receiving funds from the 
owner must pay costs and attorney fees, and (2) that two 
invoices (attached as exhibits thereto) provided for 
interest and attorney fees." 
This claim for fees is as illusionary as the first fee 
affidavit. Aside from the fact that these grounds are not stated 
in the Complaint, and so do not constitute a basis on which to 
justify relief in default, the Contractor's Bond Statute 
Plaintiff's counsel first used 14-2-2 UCA and now he uses 58-55-16, 
UCA. 
In 1995, Plaintiff's counsel new referred to "(a) UCC relating 
to transactions between merchants..." This is covered in 70A-2-
104(1) UCA (Determinative Statutes). 
This statute is of no aid to Plaintiff as it defines a 
merchant, 70A-2-104(l) as an agent or broker whose business is the 
sale of goods, so Sorensen, a home builder, is not per se a 
merchant. 
Finally, Plaintiff's counsel reference in his original fee 
affidavit was to a single "written bid." In 1995 he changes from 
the "written bid" to "two invoices providing for interest and 
attorney fees." 
In sum, Plaintiff's counsel has gone through three stages. 
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First, he files an open account complaint, which as a matter 
of law provides no right to attorney fees, but asked for them any 
way. 
Second, in 1991 he files a fee affidavit stating three 
unfounded claims for fees. 
Third, in 1995 he abandons the open account, his first three 
grounds for fees, and states three new grounds, equally defective. 
The court is also asked to note that on two occasions 
Plaintiff's counsel awarded himself judgments increasing fees and 
interest that he signed himself without submitting them to the 
court for its signature (Ex 9). 
In re Smith, 300 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah S.CT. 1996) held: 
"We adopted the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
('Standards'), which served to implement the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, not as a punitive measure, but 
rather to foster a legal community worthy of public 
confidence. The stated objectives of the Standards are 
to ensure and maintain the requisite high standard of 
professional conduct among lawyers and 'to protect the 
public and the administration of justice from lawyers who 
have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable 
or likely to be unable to discharge properly their 
professional responsibilities. Standards rule 1.1(1993); 
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see also In re Strong, 616 P.2d at 585. Standards rule 
4.2 states: 
'Disbarment is generally appropriate when a 
lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in 
professional misconduct . . . with 
the intent to benefit the lawyer or 
another or to deceive the court, and 
causes serious or potentially 
serious injury to a party, the 
public or the legal system . . . or 
(b) engages in serious criminal 
conduct a necessary element of which 
includes intentional interference 
with the administration of justice, 
false swearing, misrepresentation, 
fraud . . . or theft." 
Plaintiff's counsel's fee affidavits are sworn, his other 
pleadings claiming fees are subject to Rule 11, URCP interpretation 
that signing a pleading by an attorney constitutes his 
certification that the pleading is objectively well supported in 
fact and law and is not intended to harm another. 
This case is not about the parties. 
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If Plaintiff's counsel had simply submitted to Judge Jones for 
signature originally, a proper $944 judgment with costs and open 
account interest, defense counsel would have paid it as it was due 
to his overlooking the Demands for Admissions that his client was 
harmed, and for this he was prepared to take responsibility. 
The only purpose of Plaintiff's counsel is to take fees from 
the pocket of lay people to which he had to know as a matter of 
fact and law he was not entitled. 





2. PLAINTIFF, THROUGH ITS COUNSEL, HAS ACTED IN SUCH MANNER 
AS TO CONSTITUTE FRAUD ON THIS COURT. THE PROPER REMEDY 
IS TO STRIP PLAINTIFF OF ITS JUDGMENTS, DEFAULT 
PLAINTIFF, AWARD DEFENDANT FEES ON THE APEAL AND REMAND 
THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR APPROPRIATE DAMAGES. 
ANALYTICALLY, THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD ON THE COURT ARE: 
1. AN INTENTIONALLY FALSE MISREPRESENTATION OF FACT OF 
LAW, 
2. MADE TO THE COURT BY AN ATTORNEY, 
3. FOR THE PURPOSE OF MISLEADING THE COURT INTO A 
WRONG DECISION CONTRARY TO JUSTICE. 
Lead case is Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co, 322 
U.S. 238 US 396 Supreme Court. Hazel sued Hartford on the basis 
the bases that Hartford was using a glass process that Hazel had 
patented. Hartford replied that the practice was in common use 
before Hazel had required the patent. To support its case Hazel 
submitted an article written by a nationally recognized glass 
authority in a glass trade journal stating the Hazel process 
extremely unique. 
Hazel lost the trial and appealed. The United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict in favor of Hartford. 
In doing so it relied strongly on the article. Hartford then 
settled paying Hazel $1,000,000 for past damages and royalties for 
future use. Ten years later Hartford discovered what it long 
suspected but couldn't prove - Hazel's attorneys and top executives 
drew the article and bribed the authority to publish it knowing 
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that contents of the article about the uniqueness of the process 
was false. 
Hartford sued to set aside the judgement, was denied at the 
District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals, but when appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court the judgment was reversed on the 
basis the article constituted fraud on the court being "false" 
evidence which Hazel effectively used to deny Hartford the benefits 
of a legitimate jury verdict. 
With that decision the United Supreme Court held Hazel 
defaulted, striped it of its judgment, and Hazel was ordered to as 
damages repay all sums it had received from Hartford, be 
responsible for such other damages were appropriate, and pay 
Hartford's attorney fees and costs. 
In re Norton, 146 P. 2d 899 (Utah 1952), an attorney was 
disbarred because he based an appeal to the state Supreme Court on 
an exhibit without advising the court that the exhibit had been 
refused admission in trial. In addition to losing his appeal he 
was disbarred for his attempted fraud on the court. 
In the case of bar, Defendant's counsels urging the court that 
he has a contract providing for fees, knowing there was no such 
contract, compares with Norton, supra, as in both the attorney 
knowingly tries to persuade the court, for their advantage to 
accept as a fact something which they know is not so. 
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Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 7770 P. 2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 
1989) not only holds that there must be solid evidence to support 
entry of a judgment for fees, it also holds that it is the 
attorney's duty to objectively know and apply the law, with the 
attorneys subject to sanctions if he does not do so. 
Pomery on Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed - §397, states: 
"Whenever a party who seeks to set the judicial 
machinery in motion an obtain a remedy, has violated 
conscience, or good faith, or some other equitable 
principle in his prior conduct, then the door shall be 
shut against him in limine." 
Similarly Mas v. Coca-Cola Co.,163 F.2d 505 (CCA 4th, 1947), 
defaulted a Plaintiff who attempted to defraud the court by using 
back dated documents to assert an unfounded patent attack. 
Utah case law is in accord. In re Norton, supra, Bowen v. 
Qlsen, 246 P.2d 246 602 (Utah 1952). 
With these criteria how does the law fit the facts of 
Plaintiffs counsels conduct? 
The facts have been stated, possibly overstated, in the 
Statement of Facts and in Argument Point I. 
Intent can be determined from conduct. 
It would seem that Plaintiff's counsel had no intent to serve 
his client as that small $900.00 judgment would have been paid in 
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1991 if Plaintiff's counsel had stuck to what he had - an 
open account and nothing more. 
The original sworn fee affidavit (Ex.3) was clearly intended 
to persuade the court to award fees. 
Each of the three grounds stated for fees are a plain untruth. 
Plaintiff's counsels intent was to obtain fees to which he was 
not entitled as a matter of law. 
Thus, all the elements of fraud on the court are met -
intentional misrepresentation of fact and law; intended to mislead 
the court; for the purpose of giving Plaintiff's counsel money from 
lay people who did not owe it. 
Finally, as Plaintiff's counsel now relies on new claims, not 
in his complaint, such as the law of merchants and the Contractor's 
Licensing Statute, and now two written contracts, his intent 
becomes confirmed. 
He knew to start with he had no right to fees on an open 
account so he filed the fee affidavit. With those grounds being 
controverted, he invents yet new false grounds. 
Plaintiff's counsel's conduct goes past any explanation based 
on mistake or good faith. His own pleadings easily carry the 
burden of proof of "clear and convincing evidence" often required 
to establish fraud on the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
All judgments in favor of Plaintiff should be set aside and 
the case remanded for appropriate damages to be awarded to 
Defendants and Defendant's counsel should be awarded costs and fees 
both for this appeal and for all proceedings leading up to it from 
the date, February 15, 1991 when Plaintiff's counsel first obtained 
his flawed judgment, together with such other relief as the court 
may deem proper. 
Dated October 23, 1996 
.yt> ' * <•' ' I-^ c- L^" 




I certify that on this a ^ f day of October, 1996, I mailed 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument by United 
States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following party: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff\Respondent 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 




BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#309 2) 
Attorney at Law 
37 60 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephoner (801) 273-3962 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAZE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE, r COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION, 




Plaintiff, Ivie Electric Service, by and through its 
undersigned counsel, hereby complains and alleges as follows: 
1. Ivie Electric Service is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
is the assignee of all causes of action that Brent Ivie Electric, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation, ("Ivie") and Main Street Lighting, a Utah 
Corporation, ("Main Street: ") may have against the defendants 
herein -
2. Upon information and belief, defendant Neil Sorenson 
Construction (hereinafter, "Sorenson") is a Utah corporation whose 
principal place of business is located in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
3. Defendant Cindy Cain (hereinafter, "Cain") at all times 
relevant hereto was the owner and beneficiary of the property 
located at , Utah (the "Cain 
Property"). 
4. Defendant Russell Sorenson is an individual who, upon 
information and belief, is the controlling shareholder of defendant 
"Sorenson", and has operated the same without regard to observing 
the normal corporate formalities and as a mere alter ego of 
himself. As such, defendant Russell Sorenson should be held 
personally liable for the amounts due and owing to plaintiff herein 
from the corporate defendant Sorenson in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice being perpetrated upon the plaintiff herein. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
FAILURE TO FULFILL CONTRACT 
5. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 4 above as if set forth in their 
entirety. 
6. Defendant Sorenson entered into an agreement with Main 
Street to provide electrical materials for the Cain property. 
7. Main Street provided said materials to the defendants 
for which the amounc of $947.44 is owing as of April 4, 1989. 
8. Defendants have failed to pay the balance due of $947.44. 
9 . The principal amount due and owing for materials provided 
by Main Street to defendants is $947.44 together with interest at 
18% per annum from April 4, 1989 until paid in full, court costs, 
and reasonable attorney's fees. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
QUANTUM MERUIT 
10. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 above as if set forth in their 
entirety. 
11. Main Street has provided to defendant Cain materials which 
are the subject matter of this litigation which materials have 
conferred a substantial value upon defendant Cain and her property. 
12. Main Street provided its materials to defendant Cain with 
the expectation of being compensated therefor in an amount equal to 
rhe reasonable value of the materials. 
13. Main Street has not acted as a volunteer or an 
intermeddler in conducting itself as alleged herein and defendants 
Sorenson and Cain at all times have acknowledged that the actions 
of the Main Street have conferred substantial benefit upon them 
with respect to the materials provided. 
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14. To permit defendant Cain to retain the benefits received 
by nhem from Main Street without compensating Main Street therefor 
would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant Cain at the 
expense of Main Street, which unjust enrichment should not be 
countenanced by a court of equity. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
FAILURE TO OBTAIN BOND 
15. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 14 above as if set forth in their 
entirety. 
16. On information and belief, defendant Cain is the 
owner of an interest in certain real property situated in Salt Lake 
County described above, and entered into a contract with defendant 
Sorenson who was the general contractor, involving over $2000.00 
for the improvement of said property. 
17. Defendant Sorenson entered into an agreement with Main 
Street Lighting, whereby Main Street was to provide certain 
electrical materials to the defendant Cain's Property. This 
agreement provided that defendant Sorenson would pay Main Street 
for the fair and reasonable value of said materials provided, of 
which the amount of $947.44 is still owing, together with interest 
at the rate of 18% per annum on the principal balance due from 
April 4, 1989, unril paid in full, plus costs and attorney's fees. 
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18. Main Street provided materials to the defendant Cain's 
Property for which Main Street has not been paid in full. There is 
presently due and owing the sum of $947.44 for the materials 
provided by plaintiff to the Property, which sum has been due and 
owing since April 4, 19 89. 
19. Defendant Cain is individually, severally and personally 
liable to plaintiff for the reasonable value of the materials and 
labor provided to her Property, and stands in the shoes of 
defendant Sorenson with respect to Sorenson's obligations to pay 
Ivie Electric Service the principal, interest, attorney's fees and 
costs of collection due herein-
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
FAILURE TO FULFIL CONTRACT 
20. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above as if set forth in their 
entirety. 
21. Defendant Russell Sorenson entered into an agreement to 
purchase electrical supplies from Main Street Lighting. Pursuant 
to this agreement, Main Street Lighting delivered to Russell 
Sorenson certain supplies and billed him therefore. A true and 
correct copy of the invoice for these supplies is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. 
22. Defendant Russell Sorenson has not paid for these items, 
5 
and there remains due and owing to Main Street Lighting the sum of 
$65.86, together with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum 
from March 23, 1989, until paid in full, costs of suit and 
attorney's fees. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. Pursuant to the First Cause of Action, for Judgment 
against the defendants Neil Sorenson Construction and Russell 
Sorenson, jointly and severally, in the amount of $947.44, together 
with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from April 4, 
until paid in full, for costs of court incurred in the bringing of 
this action and reasonable attorney's fees. 
2. Pursuant to the Second and Third Causes of Action, for 
judgment against Defendant Cindy Cain in the amount of $947.44, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from 
April 4, 19 89 until paid in full, for costs incurred in the 
bringing of this action and reasonable attorney's fees. 
3. Pursuant to the Fourth Cause of Action, for a judgment 
against Russell Sorenson in the amount of $65.86, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from March 23, 1989, 
until paid in full, for costs of court and attorney's fees. 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just under the 
circumstances. 
6 
DATED this day of December, 1989. 
Brian W\ Steffe 




BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092) 
Attorney at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 
&» ,LJ ,
 ta-,|Rt 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
 f STATE OF UTAH 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE, : 
Plaintiff, i 
VS. J 
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, : 
RUSSELL SORENSEN, and CINDY CAIN, : 
Defendants, : 
• Summary Judgment 
: Civil No. 903008156 
* Judge Maurice D. Jones 
Pursuant to the Order granting summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is 
entered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Neil 
Sorensen Construction and Russell Sorensen, jointly and severally, 
for the following: 
1. $947.44 in principal; 
2. Interest on said principal amount at 18% per annum from 
April 4, 1989 until February 26, 1991 in the amount of $323.06; 
plus interest on said principal amount at 18% per annum thereafter 
until paid in full; 
3. Costs of $44.25 and attorney's fees of $2783.15; plus 
any additional attorney's fees incurred in collecting this judgment 
upon motion supported by counsel's affidavit; 
4. With interest on the amounts in item 3 at 12% from the 
date of judgment until paid in full. 
And a separate judgment against Russell Sorensen for $65.86 
plus interest thereon at 18% from March 23, 1989 until paid in 
full. " -r 
DATED the jd day <5£~" —h ^£— , /9?/. 
By the 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
, I hereby certify that on the day of A^?gP^ , 
I' fy'lj / I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
Summary Judgment, any objections to which must be filed within five 
days, to be mailed, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Samuel King 
King, Meservy & Dent 
301 Gump & Ayers Building 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Tab 3 
3RIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092) 
A t t o r n e y a t Law FE8 1 4 1991 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IVIS ELECTRIC SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, : 
RUSSELL SORENSEN, and CINDY CAIN, : 
Defendants, : 
: Affidavit of Costs and 
: Attorney's Fees 
: (Revised and Updated) 
Civil No. 903008156 
Judge Maurice D. Jones 
STATS OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF;SALT LAKE ) 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the 
Stare of Utah, and am one of the attorney's of record for the 
plaintiff in the above-captioned matter- As such I have actual 
knowledge of facts with respect to the costs and legal fees 
incurred in this matter. 
2. To the date hereof, the plaintiff has incurred costs of 
$15.00 for the filing fee and $36.50 for service of process 
charges. 
3. Plaintiff has also incurred legal fees in the amount of 
$2783.15. The attorneys in this office have spent slightly less 
than 30 hours_ over the ]?ast 20 months at $95.00 per hour in 
initlally_attempting to neg^j=a^^jL_sertlggient or th'is matter.prior-
%o the commencement:' of litigation, preparing the summons and' 
fcomplaint and initial discovery herein, communicating and 
corresponding with the opposition, drafting motion for summary 
judgment, follow up memoranda, correspondence and telephone calls 
to and from opposing counsel, preparing default documents, 
preparing motion to disqualify and motion to reconsider, preparing 
reply memoranda, correspondence to counsel and court/ arguing 
motions at court, preparing orders and judgments, corresponding to 
counsel and court. 
4. Based upon my personal knowledge and experience, the sum 
of $2783.15 is a reasonable attorney's fee for the type and amount 
of services rendered to date, and does not include fees for future 
services that may be rendered in the process of collecting this 
judgment. 
5. Plaintiff sued defendant Cindy Cain under the 
contractor' s .bond—s^^tute. Said statute and the cases that 
"construe it require the owner of the real property to honor the 
agreements between a general contractor and his subcontractors if 
the owner did not obtain a payment bond protecting the 
subcontractors. The general ^ contractor, defendant Neil Sorenson 
Construction
 f entered into an agreement with plaintiff's 
predecessor in interest that required the general contractor to pay 
JLntefest"~lnr^8%^ costs anc attorney's fees in" the 
event of nonpayment^ Under,the Utah U.C.CT, Section /uS^2-2Dl et 
sec.
 r the written bid a~nd then the written invoice rrom plaintiff's* 
predecessor in interest to the general contractor in connection 
with the purchase by the general contractor of lighting fixtures 
form the agreement of the partiesr and is fully enforceable against 
the buvex of the goods. ei7The written bid provided for _the: 
aforementioned interest and attorney's fees- This is the basis for. 
plaintiff's claim for interest at 18% and costs and attorney's fees 
from defendant Cain. 
: DATED this / 3 1 day of /G4> . jffil. 
BRIAN W. S7E—HSEH 
3rian W. Steffensen 
s~ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f^> day of 
Notary Puolic 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /S' day of /t^. , 
[C/Tf
 r x caused a true and correct copy or tne foregoxng 
instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Samuel King 
King, Meservy & Dent 
301 Gurno & Ayers Building 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
BRIAN W. S7EFFSNSEN 
Tab 4 
PAGE 
MAIN STREET LIGHTING 
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f l i c n 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092) « « LC U 
3 7 6 r H i g h l L d a D r i v e f Su i te 200 ! 2S M 2U » 9 W 
Sa l t Lake City , Utah 84106 ziERY, Of THE c . ^ i ' T ~o T 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 SALT LAKCTIVISIGN ""' 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, 
RUSSELL SORENSEN, and CINDY CAIN, 
Defendants, 
Order Setting Aside 
Default Against Cain, 
Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Summary Judgment, 
And Denying Defendants' 
Other Motions 
Civil No. 903008156 
Judge Maurice Jones 
The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment against defendant 
Cindy Cain and related motions of Cindy Cain, and the Motion of 
Defendant Neil Sorenson Construction and of Russell Sorenson to Set 
Aside Default Judgment [sic] For Summary Judgment, Fees and 
Sanctions, having come on for hearing before the Honorable Maurice 
Jones on the 13th day of May, 1991, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the 
plaintiff being represented by Brian W. Steffensen and the 
defendants by Samuel King, and the Court having reviewed the 
memoranda filed by the parties in connection therewith, and having 
heard oral argument from counsel, and finding good cause therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The default judgment against Cindy Cain is hereby set 
aside, and she shall have 20 days from the date hereof to file a 
pleading responsive to plaintiff's complaint against her. 
2. Defendants Neil Sorenson Construction and Russell 
Sorenson's motion to set aside default judgment, for summary 
judgment, fees and sanctions against the plaintiff dated April 11, 
1991, is denied* 
3* The other motions of Cindy Cain are denied without 
prejudice. 
4. The Order Staying Execution against defendants Neil 
Sorenson Construction and Russell Sorenson entered by Judge Gowans 
on or about March 19, 1991, is hereby dissolved; and the surety 
thereon, Samuel King, is directed to pay forthwith to the plaintiff 
all sums presently, and which may hereafter become, due and owing 
on the judgment herein as per his undertaking in connection with 
the motion to stay execution. 
5. The Summary Judgment against defendants Neil Sorenson 
Construction and Russell Sorensen is increased by the amount of 
plaintiff's additional attorney's fees incurred in defending 
against defendants' various motions since the entry of said Summary 
Judgment pursuant to paragraph 3 thereof, in the amount of 
$3,875.00 as supported by plaintiff's counsel's affidavit. 
Dated the f2 / day of }xd^4^' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIMG 
I hereby certify that on the /^ day of \IA*«-*~ , 
/y»/ , I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Samuel King 
King, Meservy & Dent 
301 Gump & Ayers Building 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092) 
Attorney at Law 
37 60 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 y 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, 
RUSSELL SORENSEN, and CINDY 
Defendants, 
CA: :N, : 
: Findings of Fact and 
: Conclusions of Law and 
: Order 
Civil No. 903008156 
Judge Maurice Jones 
Defendants' counsel having filed "Defendants' Motion for 
Stay ot Execution, For Extension of Time in Which to File Appeal 
and for review of All Proceedings", and the Court having heard oral 
argument on the same on August 23, 1991, and again on September 27, 
1991, plaintiff being represented by Brian W. Steffensen and 
defendants by Samuel King, and the Court having considered Mr. 
Zing's request for findings as to its prior orders and its order in 
response to Mr. King's latest Motion, the Court determines that it 
would be helpful to all concerned if it set forth its findings in 
this matter and then its final ruling based thereon; 
Consequently, the Court finds and concludes as follows from 
the pleadings and admissions on file herein: 
§r 
i 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
« U J LAKE DEPARTMENT 
1. Plaintiff filed this action in the late spring of 1990, 
and caused a summons, complaint and discovery (which discovery 
included requests for admission) to be served upon defendant Cindy 
Cain ("Cain") and the other "Sorensen Defendants" herein. 
2. The Sorensen Defendants answered plaintiff's complaint 
without making a motion for more definite statement or to quash 
because an exhibit thereto was not attached. 
3. The plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on two 
independent factual grounds: (i) the requests for admissions 
served on the defendants which had not been responded to, and (ii) 
a statement of undisputed facrts verified under penalty of perjury 
by Brent Ivie. 
4. The Sorensen Defendants filed a "Defenses to Motion for 
Summary ^udg^ent" which did not constitute a motion to withdraw or 
amend trie admissions and which did not refute tne statement of 
undisputed facts as required in the Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Consequently the plaintiff's factual assertions 
in the requests for admission and in the unrefuted statement of 
undisputed facts that: 
(a) there were valid and enforceable agreements between 
plaintiff and the Sorenson Defendants which require the Sorenson 
Defendants to pay plaintiff the principal balance due, plus 
interest thereon at 18% per annum and plaintiff's attorney's fees; 
2 
(b) the defendants have no valid defenses, counterclaims 
or set-offs against plaintiff's claims; and 
(c) defendant Cain is liable to plaintiff for these same 
amounts (principal, interest and attorney's fees) under the bond 
stature and the theory of quantum meruit:; 
were all deemed admitted and conclusively established for all-
purposes in this litigation. 
5. After hearing oral argument on these motions on January 
24, 1391, the Court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
in accordance with the foregoing admitted and conclusively 
established facts. 
6. On or about February 13, 1991, plaintiff caused copies 
of the proposed orders re the motions and granting summary judgment 
to be mailed to the Sor^ n.^ er Defendants' ccur.se1, Mr. Kiir^ -. Mr. 
King did not objecr to the language of rhose orders cr the 
Affidavit of Counsel re Costs and Fees accompanying them, and the 
Court subsequently executed them. 
7. On March 19, 1991, Mr. King obtained an Order Staying 
Execution supported solely by Mr. King's personal promise to 
promptly pay any judgment obtained against defendants when due. 
8. Thereafter, Mr. King filed two motions to set aside the 
Court's granting of summary judgment, which were denied by the 
Court. 
3 
9. Mr. King now seeks, for apparently the third time, to 
have the Court set aside its prior granting of summary judgment in 
favor of plaintiff and against the Sorenson Defendants. However, 
the admissions upon which the Court previously based its ruling 
granring this summary judgmenr remain unwithdrawn and unamended 
such thar rhey continue to be of full force and effect and binding 
upon rhe Court herein. 
10. Based upon these admissions, the Courr still finds 
thar: 
(a) the Sorenson Defendants owe plaintiff the 
principal amounts plus interest alleged in the complaint and set 
forth in the admissions; 
(b) the agreements between the plaintiff and the 
Sorenson Defendants provider. ?czr —tcrney's fees to plaintiff; 
(c) the Sorenson defendants have no defenses, 
counterclaims or setoffs against plaintiff's claims against them 
herein. 
11. Mr. King disputes plaintiff's counsel's affidavits of 
attorney's fees and seeks to take the deposition of counsel on the 
issue of fees. The Court finds plaintiff's counsel's affidavits, 
taken as a whole, to provide all of the detail necessary for the 
Court to determine the reasonableness of said fees and to form a 
basis for the Court's awards herein such that there is no need to 
4 
seek additional information and/or clarification from counsel by 
way of deposition. 
Consequently, ITS IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that all orders of this Court entered prior hereto granting 
plaintiff judgment against the Sorenson Defendants and their 
surery, Mr. King, for principal, interest and attorney's fees are 
hereby reaffirmed; defendants' motions to set aside or modify the 
same are all denied; defendants' motion for leave to depose 
plaintiff's counsel is denied; plaintiff is granted an additional 
award against the Sorenson Defendants and their surety Samuel King 
of attorney's fees incurred in this action in defending against the 
defendants' unsuccessful motions which have not been previously 
awarded herein from June I'7, 1991 through the present in the amount 
of $3,^12-^0 through thft •<»:- L^rscf, less thuse attorney's fees 
previously awarded to plaintiff vrhich plaintiff has admitted were 
related to defending against defendant Cain's motion to set aside 
default judgment in the amount of $1,811.00, as supported by 
plaintiff's counsel's Revised Affidavit submitted herewith, for a 
total additional award of $1,601.50. 
DATED the /Q day of/^V \£s r^Lsfi*-- /?*?C • 
By the Court:/' 
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BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN, P-G (#3092) 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 485-3707 
Facsimile (801) 485-7140 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE, / 
Order Affiparfrng Prior Court 
Plaintiff Orders^fia Awarding 
vs. Ackjkional Attorney's Fees 
T^Plaintiff 
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, / 
RUSSELL SORENSEN, and CINDY / Civil No. 903008156 
CAIN, ^ 
Judge Dennis Fuchs 
Defendants. 
Defendants' motion to reconsider prior orders and plaintiffs entitlement to attorney's fees, 
and Plaintiffs motion for an additional award of attorney's fees, having come on for hearing before 
the Honorable Dennis Fuchs on February 1, 1996, the plaintiff represented by Brian W. Steffensen, 
and the defendants by Samuel King, and the Court having reviewed the written materials prepared 
by the parties, and heard oral arguments, 
The Court Makes The Following Findings and Rulings: 
1. Despite the Court's order and admonition that it would not reconsider prior rulings 
of this Court, defendants submitted written materials and oral argument urging the Court to find that 
plaintiff and its counsel committed wrongful acts and/or that plaintiff was otherwise not entitled to 
an award of attorney's fees. 
2. The Court does not believe that the defendants5 motions are procedurally proper, but 
given the nature of its findings as set forth hereafter, will rule on them any way. 
3. This Court reviewed the record, memoranda and arguments in this matter, and finds 
that: 
a. The defendants did not respond to plaintiffs requests for admission within 
thirty (30) days as required by the rules, such that said admissions became deemed admitted; 
b. The defendants did not properly dispute the plaintiffs statement of undisputed 
facts in connection with plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, such that said statement of 
undisputed facts became deemed admitted for the purposes of said motion; 
c. Judge Maurice Jones, having also found the same facts to be true, properly 
granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, including the awarding of attorney's fees; 
d. The defendants almost immediately made motions to set aside this ruling, and 
charged that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees; 
e. The plaintiff filed opposing memoranda demonstrating that there were not only 
deemed admitted admissions requiring the awarding of attorney's fees, but that there were signed 
invoices and statutory grounds upon which attorney's fees were properly awarded; 
f. Judge Maurice Jones, therefore, properly denied all of defendants' motions 
attacking plaintiff s judgment, and properly awarded additional attorney's fees to plaintiff, 
g. Neither Plaintiff nor its counsel has committed any fraud upon this Court, nor 
otherwise improperly acted in this action; 
h. The amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred by the parties in this case far 
exceeds the principal amounts in dispute, but that is the direct result of the defendants' incessant and 
2 
groundless motions to set aside this Court's rulings and orders; 
i. The amount of attorney's fees previously awarded by this Court to plaintiff 
was properly incurred by plaintiff and properly awarded by the Court; 
j . The prior judgments of this Court require the awarding of additional attorney's 
fees and costs incurred by plaintiff since the last fees and costs were awarded; 
k. The amount of costs and fees sought by plaintiff as set forth in plaintiffs 
memorandum dated December 18, 1995 on page 13 is appropriate; 
L The methodology employed by plaintiff in calculating the amount currently due 
under this Court's orders as set forth in plaintiffs memorandum dated December 18, 1995 on page 
13 is also appropriate; 
m. The judgments of this Court are against not only the named defendants herein, 
but also against their counsel, Samuel King, pursuant to his surety given to Judge Gowans in 
connection with the motion to stay execution filed by Mr. King and Order Staying Execution of 
Judgment as to Defendants Neil Sorensen Construction and Russell Sorensen dated March 19, 1991; 
n. The defendants were given opportunities previously to file any desired appeals, 
but elected not to do so. 
4. Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court denies defendants' motions and grants 
plaintiffs request for additional attorney's fees. 
5. The plaintiff is awarded an additional $7,125.00 in attorney's fees against defendants 
Neil Sorensen Construction, Russell Sorensen and Samuel King.. 
3 
6. The defendants and their counsel are admonished not to file any further motions in this 
matter, or be subject to sanctions. 
DATED this / J ^ d a y oft§aTelC1996. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of March, 1996,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, and faxed, addressed to: 
Samuel King 
2120 South, 1300 East, Suite 301 
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Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Misc Revenue 
Civil File Fee 






















































Party..: PLA Plaintiff 
Name...: 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE 
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Case : 903008156 CV Civil Filing Date: 07/25/90 
Case Title: Judge: Dennis M. Fuchs 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE VS NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
SORENSON, RUSSELL 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
CAIN, CINDY 
Party..: ATP Atty for Plaintiff 
Name...: 
STEFFENSEN, BRIAN W 
Party..: PYR Payor 
Name.. .: 
SAMUEL KING 
2120 S 1300 E #301 
SLC UT 
I 07/25/90 Case filed on 07/25/90. 
07/26/90 901440153 Civil filing fee received 
PAH 
15.00 PAH 
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FILED ANSWER OF NEIL SORENSON CONST AND RUSSELL SORENSON GLD 
AND WLP 
FILED: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF WLP 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WLP 
FILED: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WLP 
FILED: SUMMONS ON RETRUN-SERVED (CINDY CAIN) DGP 
FIELD: DEFENDANTS ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS WLP 
FILED: DEFENDANTS DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY WLP 
JUDGMENT WLP 
JUDGE GRANT DENIED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFTS DGP 
NEIL SORENSON CONSTR. AND RUSSELL SORENSON (HE SAID THERE DGP 
APPEARS TO BE A QUESTION OF FACT) (NOTIFIED ALL PARTIES) DGP 
FILED PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF'S DGP 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DGP 
CLERK ENTERED DEFAULT CERTIFICATE AS TO DEFT CINDY CAIN ONLY DGP 
FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT JAR 
*** FILE GIVEN TO GRANT *** JAR 
FILED:MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING GLD 
FILED:MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GLD 
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT GLD 
FILED:VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF POINT & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF GLD 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING SGC 
FILED DEFT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION GLD 
FILED REPLY MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING GLD 
FILED REPLY TO DEFTS REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SGC 
RECONSIDERATION GLD 
FILED REPLY TO DEFTS REPLY TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING GLD 
FILED REQUEST FOR HEARING (MOTION TO DISQUALIFY & MOTION TO GLD 
RECONSIDER) GLD 
FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT (MOTION TO DISQUALIFY & RECONSIDER) GLD 
FILED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT (WRONG DOLLAR AMOUNT SENT, CLERK TO PAH 
CALL ATD SAMUEL KING TO REMIT PROPER AMOUNT) PAH 
FILED DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES DEMAND APJ 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND DEMAND FOR ADMISSIONS APJ 
902400006 Miscellaneous civil fee received 30.00 PAH 
FILED DEFT NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION GLD 
JUDGE GRANT RECUSES HIMSELF FROM CASE. CKN 
CASE REASSIGNED TO JUDGE JONES (JUDGE GRANT UNAVAILABLE) CKN 
JONES/SC HEARING SET FOR 1/24/91 AT 10 AM ATP/ATD NOTIFIED SGC 
RG scheduled for 1/24/91 at 10:00 A in room ? with MDJ SGC 
JONES/SC T189 C1790 T190 C0001 BRIAN STEPHENSEN PRESENT FOR SGC 
PTLF, SAMUEL KING FOR DEFT. COURT DENIED PLTF MOTION TO DISQUAL SGC 
ATD KING. COURT ORDERED PLTF MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTION FOR SGC 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. SGC 
Began tracking Taken Under Advisement Review on 02/24/91 SGC 
JONES/SC COURT HAVING TAKEN THIS MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT, GRANT SGC 
PLTF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ATP/ATD NOTIFIED BY PHONE & SGC 
DOCKET COPY. SGC 
Ended tracking of Taken Under Advisement SGC 
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JONES ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION AND PLD 
RUSSELL SORENSEN, $4097.90, $65.86 RUSSELL PLD 
PILED AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES PLD 
JONES SIGNED ORDER THAT PLTF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING PLD 
IS DENIED, AND PLTIF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND TO GRANT PLD 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED PLD 
JONES SIGNED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION AND PLD 
RUSSELL SORENSEN ONLY!!!!!!, $947.44 PRINCIPAL, $323.06 PLD 
INTEREST, $44.25 COSTS, $2783.15 ATTORNEY'S FEES, PLD 
$4097.90 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLD 
A SEPARATE JUDGMENT AGAINST RUSSELL SORENSEN FOR $65.86 PLD 
PLUS INTEREST. PLD 
Case judgment is Summary judgment PLD 
JUDGE JONES ENTERED ORDERED PLD 
910350466 Miscellaneous civil fee received 5.00 PAH 
FILED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER FINDING DEFENDANT'S PLD 
IN DEFAULT FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S PLD 
"REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS" AND FOR SANCTION AND FEES PLD 
JONES SIGNED DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON CINDY CAIN ONLY!!!!!!, $947.44 PLD 
PRINCIPAL, $44.25 COSTS, $2783.15 ATTORNEY'S FEES, PLD 
$3774.84 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLD 
JUDGE JONES ENTERED DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON CINDY CAIN, $3774.84 PLD 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITON TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE PLD 
ORDER, AND FOR SANCTION AND FEES PLD 
ISSUED EXEC AND FILED PRAECIPE BMC 
910460399 Miscellaneous civil fee received 5.00 BMC 
FILED DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR HEARING PLD 
FILED DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION PLD 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER PLD 
NOTIFIED SAMUEL KING - ATD OF HEARING DATE OF 4-17-91 AT 2:00 PM PLD 
ATD TO NOTIFY PLTF. PLD 
FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT PLD 
FILED OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR HEARING PLD 
GOWANS FOR JONES SIGNED ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT PLD 
AS TO DEFENDANTS NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION AND RUSSELL PLD 
SORENSEN PLD 
GOWANS FOR JONES ENTERED ORDER PLD 
FILED MOTION OF DEFENDANT'S NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION AND PLD 
RUSSELL SORENSEN TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT PLD 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING - 4-17-91 2:00 P.M. PLD 
HRG scheduled for 4/17/91 at 2:00 P in room ? with MDJ PLD 
JONES/PLD OFF RECORD SET FOR HEARING DEFT.'S MOTION TO SET PLD 
ASIDE DEFAULT. PLD 
FILED: MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT CAIN TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDG- WLp 
MENT, FOR LEAVE TO FILE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, FOR WLP 
RULE 12(B) (6) URCP RULING AND FOR FEES WLP 
SAMUEL KING PHONED REQUEST CONTINUANCE ON HEARING PLD 
JONES/PLD OFF RECORD C/O HEARING CONTINUED TIL 5-8-91 AT 10:00 PLD 
MAILED NOTICES TO EACH PARTY PLD 
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04/11/91 HRG rescheduled to 5/ 8/91 at 10:00 A in room ? with MDJ PLD 
I FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION FOR WLP 
I JUDGMENT WLP 
I FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT CAIN TO PLD 
I SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLD 
I 04/15/91 FILED COPY OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT MKK 
I CAIN TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT... MKK 
I FILED COPY OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO MOTION TO STAY EXECUT- MKK 
I ION OF JUDGMENT MKK 
I FILED MOTION OF DEFENDANT NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION & OF RUSSEL PLD 
I SORENSON TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR SUMMARY PLD 
I JUDGMENT, FEES AND SANCTIONS AND REQUEST FOR SPECIAL PLD 
I SETTING FOR ORAL ARGUMENT PLD 
I 04/19/91 FILED: DEFT CAIN'S REPLY TO PLTFS MEMO CEJ 
I 04/29/91 FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO DEFENDANT NEIL SORENSON PLD 
I CONSTRUCTION AND OF RUSSELL SORENSON TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT PLD 
I JUDGMENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FEES AND SANCTIONS AND PLD 
I REQUEST FOR SPECIAL SETTING FOR ORAL ARGUMENT PLD 
05/02/91 JONES/SC HEARING CONTINUED TO 5/13/91 AT 9:30 AM. PLTF & DEFT SGC 
COUNSEL NOTIFIED BY PHONE, NOTICES MAILED. SGC 
HRG rescheduled to 5/13/91 at 9:30 A in room ? with MDJ SGC 
I FILED SORENSON'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION PLD 
05/06/91 JONES DENIES MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PLD 
:OPY OF DOCKET ENTRY SENT TO EACH PARTY) PLD 
05/13/9JI/JONES/SC T962 C1450 BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT FOR PLTF, SGC 
SAMUEL KING PRESENT ON DEFT BEHALF. SGC 
COURT ORDERED DEFT MOTION TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. SGC 
Began tracking Taken Under Advisement Review on 06/13/91 SGC 
05/29/91 JONES/SC COURT HAVING TAKEN THIS MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT FINDS: SGC 
DEFT MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO CINDY CAIN SGC 
GRANTED. SGC 
DEFT MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO SORENSEN SGC 
CONSTRUCTION DENIED. SGC 
COPIES OF DOCKET MAILED TO COUNSEL. SGC 
Ended tracking of Taken Under Advisement SGC 
05/30/91 FILED LETTER FROM SAMUEL KING PLD 
I 06/06/91 FILED NOTICE OF MAILIGN PLD 
I 06/20/91 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL RE COSTS AND FEES INCURRED SINCE PLD 
I ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLD 
I FILED OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER PREPARED BY DEFENDANTS' ON PLD 
I CINDY CAIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT PLD 
I 06/21/91 JONES SIGNED ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AGAINST CAIN, DENYING PLD 
I MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING PLD 
I DEFENDANT'S OTHER MOTIONS PLD 
I 07/01/91 FILED REPLY OF CINDY CAIN TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER & PLD 
I OBJECTION OF DEFENDNATS TO PLAINTFF'S PROPOSED "ORDER PLD 
I SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AGAINST CAINE, DENYING MOTION TO SET PLD 
I ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S OTHER PLD 
I MOTIONS" AND MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING PLD 
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FILED REPLY TO "DEFENDANTS SORENSON'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PLD 
ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST AND AFFIDAVIT AND PROPOSED JUDGMENT PLD 
FILED OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER PREPARED BY DEFENDANTS ON THE PLD 
SORENSON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT ETC. PLD 
FILED MOTIONFOR PROTECTIWE ORDER PLD 
FILED NOTICE OF JUDGMENT PLD 
FILED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION, FOR EXTENSION OF PLD 
TIME IN WHICH TO FILE APPEARL, AND FOR REVIEW OF ALL PLD 
PROCEEDINGS - SAMUEL KING PLD 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY OF PLD 
EXECUTION, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE APPEAL, PLD 
AND FOR REVIEW OF ALL PROCEEDINGS" AND MOTION FOR PLD 
ATTORNEY'S FEES PLD 
TGNED ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR APPEAL PLD 
JONES ENTERED ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR APPEAL PLD 
:LED: ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF CINDY CAIN MEM 
JONES/PLD T-1657 C-617 BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT FOR THE PLAINTIF PLD 
SAMUEL KING PRESENT FOR THE DEFENDANT PLD 
COURT DENIES ANY FURTHER REQUESTS PLD 
911630147 Counterclaim fee received 25.00 MEM 
FILED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM PLD 
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL - RE COSTS AND FEES THROUGHOUT THIS PLD 
CASE PLD 
FILED REQUEST FOR RECUSAL - SAMUEL KING PLD 
FILED LETTER FROM BRIAN W STEFFENSEN PLD 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITON TO "DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY-OF PLD 
EXECUTION, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE APPEAL, PLD 
AND FOR REVIEW OF ALL PROCEEDINGS" AND FOR MOTION FOR PLD 
ATTORNEY'S FEES PLD 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING - 9-19-91 PLD 
FILED STATEMENT OF ISSUES PENDING PLD 
HRG scheduled for 9/19/91 at 9:30 A in room ? with MDJ PLD 
FILED MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - BRIAN W STEFFENSEN PLD 
FILED PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM OF CINDY CAIN - BRIAN PLD 
W. STEFFENSEN PLD 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' "STATEMENT OF PLD 
PENDING ISSUES" AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES - BRIAN W. PLD 
STEFFENSEN PLD 
9-19-91 - BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN PLD 
SERVED CINDY CAIN PERSONALLY PLD 
SERVED NEIL SORSENSEN CONSTRUCTION PLD 
SERVED RUSSELL SORENSEN PLD 
FILED: STIPULATED MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING TO 9/27/91 AT 9:30A SGC 
MDJ ENTERED ORDER MOTION HEARING CONTINUED TO 9/27/91 AT 9:30 AM SGC 
HRG rescheduled to 9/27/91 at 9:30 A in room ? with MDJ SGC 
FILED STIPULATION TO CONTINUANCE PLD 
iLED MOTION TO CONTINUING HEARING PLD 
JONES SIGNED ORDER TO CONTINUING HEARING - 9-27-91 AT 9:30 A.M. PLD 
JONES/SC T1872 C1187 SAM KING PRESENT ON DEFT BAHALF, PLTF SGC 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING 
FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN 
FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN 
FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN 
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PRESENTED BY BRIAN STEFFENSEN. DEFT COUNSEL ENTERED MOTION. SGC 
(C2126) PLTF ARGUMENT ENTERED. (C2730) DEFT COUNSEL REBUTTLE. SGC 
COURT TO ENTER FINDINGS IN WRITING. SGC 
COURT FINDS CASE PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED MAY NOT BE CONSOLIDATED SGC 
WITH THIS MATTER. SGC 
FILED LETTER FROM BRIAN W STEFFENSEN PLD 
JONES/SC COURT RULES THAT: SGC 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER, THEREFORE WILL NOT BE SET SGC 
ASIDE. SGC 
2 DEFT ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES & REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS SGC 
WAS LATE & PLTF REFUSSAL TO ACCEPT THEM IS PROPER. SGC 
3 DEFT CLAIM TO RIGHT TO TAKE DEPOSITION REGARDING PLTF SGC 
ATTORNEY FEES IS ERRONEOUS. PLTF ATTORNEY TESTIMONY IS SGC 
SUFFICIENT. SGC 
PRIOR RULINGS OF THE COURT WILL NOT BE ALTERED. SGC 
REQUEST BY DEFT FOR RECONSIDERATION IS INAPPROPRIATE SGC 
PLTF COUNSEL TO SUBMIT FINDINGS & ORDER FOR SIGNATURE SGC 
PLTF & DEFT COUNSEL NOTIFIED BY PHONE OF RULINGS. SGC 
CASE REASSIGNED AS PER JUDGE ROTATION - JUDGE FUCHS PLD 
FILED REPLY TO DEFENDANTS OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, TAW 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER TAW 
FILED DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLA'S ANSWER TO DEFT 7/28 OBJECTIONS SWH 
TO PLA'S PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & ORDER SWH 
FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION **FILE WILL GO UP ON 8/27 SWH 
FILED MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER MJB 
TO DEFENDANT'S JULY 28, 1992 OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED MJB 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ORDER MJB 
FILED DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S MJB 
JULY 28, 1992 OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF;S PROPOSED FINDINGS MJB 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER MJB 
FILE RETURNED: SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ASAP--JUDGE FUCHS SWH 
Notice of Setting SWH 
HRG scheduled for 09/23/92 at 0930 A in room ? with DMF SWH 
FILED OBJECTION.TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT SPK 
FILED LETTER FROM SAMUEL KING (ATD) & ORDER SETTING ASIDE SWH 
JUDGMENT AS TO DEFT CAIN SWH 
MAILED NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT TO BOTH PARTIES. SWH 
DMF/ ""ACCORDING TO THE DOCKET, JUDGE JONES SIGNED ORDER TAW 
SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AGINST CAINE ON 6/21/91. I WILL TAW 
NOT SIGN ANOTHER ONE WITHOUT SOME REASON OR A STIPULATION TAW 
FROM THE OTHER SIDE" TAW 
ALL PARTIES NOTIFIED WITH A COPY OF THE DOCKET TEXT TAW 
DMF: PER NOTICE TO SUBMIT; "NOTIFY BOTH ATTY'S THAT ALL ISSUES SWH 
WILL BE RESOLVED ON HRG DATE". *BOTH ATTYS NOTIFIED* SWH 
SENT NOTICES OF ORAL ARGUMENT SWH 
HRG iseheduled for 10/ 2/92 at 9:30 A in room ? with DMF SWH 
HRG ^^^rescheduled to 10/ 5/92 at 9:30 A in room ? with DMF SWH 
FUGH5/BM T-1926 C-1018 ATP: BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT BSM 
'D: SAM KING & JAY GANTS PRESENT BSM 
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COURT WILL NOT RE-VISIT THE ISSUES THAT WERE DECIDED BSM 
BY JUDGE GRANT & JUDGE JONES BSM 
C/O PARTIES HAVE 7 DAYS TO SEE IF THEY CAN STIPULATE TO ANY BSM 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSION REGARDING DEF OBJECTIONS BSM 
IF NOT THE COURT WILL SIGN FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS AS SUBMITTED BSM 
BY PLA ATTY BSM 
COURT WILL CERTIFY THAT THIS IS FINAL ORDER AS TO THIS DEF BSM 
JUDGE SIGNED FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER SWH 
CALLED ATP TO NOTIFY OF ORDER BEING SIGNED. SWH 
ISSUED WRIT OF EXECUTION AND PRAECIPE VLC 
932350285 Writ fee 5.00 VLC 
FILED NOTICE OF JUDGMENT *FIRST AMENDED* KJR 
FILED DEF EX PARTE MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION KJR 
FUCHS/BM ON CALL FROM DEF ATTY SAM KING CASE SET FOR HRG BSM 
HRG scheduled for 12/23/93 at 11:00 A in room ? with DMF BSM 
HRG rescheduled to 12/30/93 at 2:00 P in room ? with DMF BSM 
HRG rescheduled to 1/13/94 at 9:00 A in room ? with DMF BSM 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING SCHEDULED ON A SUNDAY CONTACTED ATD THEY KJR 
STATED THEY WILL MAIL A CORRECTED HEARING FOR 1-13-94 AT 9:00 AM KJR 
RECEIVED NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED HEARING FOR 1-3 WHICH IS STILL KJR 
INCORRECT I NOTIFIED ATD OFFICE ONCE AGAIN THAT THEY NEEDED TO KJR 
DO AN AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING SHOWING JAN 13 AS THE COURT DATE KJR 
ICE OF RESCHEDULED HEARING ATD MAILED NOTICE TO PLA KJR 
LETTER AND CASE LAW FROM ATD SAMUEL KING KJR 
CHS/BVO T90 C1701 BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE BVO 
PLFT, SAM KING PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFT BASED UPON THE BVO 
MOTION OF ATTY KING C/O MOTION DENIED AND WILL NOT RE-VISIT BVO 
PAST ORDERS C/O IF DEFT WANTS TO APPEAL CASE HE MAY POST BOND BVO 
TWICE THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT BVO 
FILED CINDY CAINE'S NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DECUS TECUM OF BRENT DJO 
IVIDE DJO 
FILED NOTICE OF JUDGMENT SN 
ISSUED WRIT OF EXECUTION AND FILED PRAECIPE MCS 
951000090 Writ fee 20.00 MCS 
REC MAIL MCS 
FILED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION, AND FURTHER RELIEF LCK 
FUCHS SIGNED ORDER STAYING EXECUTION UNTIL 07-05-95 LCK 
HEARING ON MOTION IS SCHEDULED FOR 07-05-95 AT 9:00 LCK 
MO scheduled for 7/ 5/95 at 9:00 A in room ? with DMF LCK 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING TO PLAINTIFF AND ATTORNEY BRIAN W LCK 
STEFFENSEN LCK 
FILED DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO "STAY EXECUTION AND LCK 
FOR OTHER RELIEF" RE: NECESSITY TO REVISIST LCK 
FILED OBJECTION TO ORDER STAYING EXECUTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SN 
OPPOSITION TO DEF'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION, AND FOR FURTHER SN 
RELIEF SN 
FILED DECLARATION OF BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN AS TO COSTS AND FEES SN 
INCURRED AFTER 7/20/92 AND THROUGH 7/5/95 AND NOT YET AWARDED SN 
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FILED MOTION FOR AWARD OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND FOR LCK 
SANCTIONS LCK 
FUCHS SIGNED ORDER TO STAY EXECUTION AND FOR OTHER RELIEF LCK 
FILED OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER AND RENEWED REQUEST FOR SN 
SANCTIONS AND VERIFICATION SN 
FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION LCK 
FILED DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO DPLAINTIFF'S NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR LMC 
DECISION LMC 
JUDGE FUCHS ENTERED SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT DM1 
CLERK SCHEDULED ORAL ARGUMENT HRG FOR 10/13/95 AT 9:30 A DM1 
ARG scheduled for 10/13/95 at 9:30 A in room ? with DMF DM1 
CLERK MAILED NOTICES TO ALL PARTIES DM1 
FILED LETTER FROM SAM KING PKB 
CLERK SPOKE WITH BOTH PARTIES REGARDING A MEETING IN JUDGE'S DM1 
CHAMBERS BEFORE ORAL ARGUMENT 10/13/95 - BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO DM1 
10/04/95 AT 8:30. DM1 
** FILE SENT TO JUDGE FOR CONFIRMATION ** DM1 
HRG scheduled for 12/ 4/95 at 2:00 P in room ? with DMF DM1 
FILED ORDER RE: JUDGE YOUNG'S RULING DENYING WRIT OF MANDAMUS DM1 
FILED LETTER FROM BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN TO SAM KING REGARDING DM1 
THE UPCOMING HEARING DM1 
HRG on 12/ 4/95 was cancelled DM1 
HRG scheduled for 1/ 2/96 at 9:30 A in room ? with DMF DM1 
TIPULATION FOR CONTINUANCE AND ORDER DM1 
HRG-^ on 1/ 2/96 was cancelled DM1 
CHS/PB T 041 C 445 PKB 
ATP NOT PRESENT PKB 
ATD- SAM KING PRESENT PKB 
C/O MR. KING TO CONTACT MR. STEFFENSEN AND SET UP A PKB 
_ PHONE CONFERENCE WITH THE JUDGE PKB 
FUCHS/PB OFF TAPE PKB 
PER PHONE CONFERENCE PKB 
C/O CASE RE-SET FOR HEARING PKB 
HRG scheduled for 2/ 1/96 at 9:30 A in room ? with DMF PKB 
FILED DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFF'S ENTITLEMENT TO DM1 
FEES AND INTEREST AND APPROPRIATE RELIEF. DM1 
FILED EXHIBITS RELATING TO DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS DM1 
ENTITLEMENT TO FEES AND INTEREST AND APPROPRIATE RELIEF. DM1 
FUCHS/SL T248 C2690 SL 
BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF SL 
SAMUEL KING PRESENT ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS SL 
COURT AFFIRMS ALL OF JUDGE JONES PREVIOUS ORDERS & SL 
UPHOLDS JUDGMENT & ATTORNEY FEES AS PRAYED FOR. SL 
JUDGE FUCHS GRANTS MOTION FOR AWARD OF ADDITIONAL SL 
ATTORNEYS FEES & FOR SANCTIONS SL 
JUDGE FUCHS SIGNED ORDER REGARDING JUDGE YOUNG'S SL 
RULING DENYING WRIT OF MANDAMUS. SL 
ATP, BRIAN STEFFENSEN TO PREPARE ORDER. SL 
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02/05/96 Accepted distribution TF $ 5.00 from Misc. Payments screen CN 
03/07/96 CLERK REC'D PHONE CALL FROM MIKE AT ATP'S OFFICE, HE SAID THAT DM1 
ATD HAS PREPARED AN ORDER ON THE HEARING 2/1/96 IT HAS THE DM1 
WRONG CASE # ON IT & THE WRONG JUDGE, HE ASKED THAT WE HOLD DM1 
ON TO IT UNTIL ATP'S OFFICE HAS SUBMITTED THE CORRECT ONE. DM1 
04/15/96 JUDGE FUCHS ENTERED ORDER AFFIRMING PRIOR COURT ORDERS AND DM1 
AWARDING ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAINTIFF. DM1 
05/10/96 FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL HSG 
960920475 Notice of appeal fee 190.00 HSG 
960920480 Civil bond posted ========> Check 300.00 HSG 
Posted by: SAMUEL KING HSG 
2120 S 1300 E #301 HSG 
SLC UT HSG 
APPEAL COST BOND HSG 
FILED UNDERTAKING FOR COSTS ON APPEAL CPN 
05/13/96 SENT CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AND UNDERTAKING FOR CPN 
COSTS ON APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS CPN 
End of the docket report for this case. 
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BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092) 
Attorney at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 
FILED 
930ECI0 PHU.-20 
CLERK Of THE CiRCUil COURT 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, 
RUSSELL SORENSEN, and CINDY 
Defendants, 
CAIN, : 
: Notice of Judcprfent 
: (First Amended) 
CiviJf No. 903008156 
: Judge Maurice D. Jones 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that judgmentA/as entered on February 15, 
1991, in favor of the plaintiff arra. against defendants Neil 
Sorensen Construction and Russell Soi^ ensen, jointly and severally, 
for the following: 
1. $947.44 in principal; 
2. Interest on said prirvfcipal amount at 18% per annum from 
April 4, 1989 until February 26, 1991 in the amount of $323.06; 
plus interest on said principal amount at 18% per annum thereafter 
until paid in full; 
3. Costs of $44.25 and attorney's fees of $2783.15; plus 
any additional attorney's fees incurred in collecting this judgment 
upon motion supported by counsel's affidavit; 
4. With interest on the costs and attorney's fees awarded 
at 12% per annum from the date of judgment until paid in full. 
And a separate judgment against Russell Sorensen for $65.86 
plus interest thereon at 18% from March 23, 1989 until paid in 
full. 
AND that this Judgment was increased on June 21, 1991, by 
the award of an additional $3,875.00 in attorney's fees in 
connection with the Court's denial of defendants' motions to set 
aside summary judgment. 
AND that this Judgment was increased again on December 16, 
1992, by the award of an additional $1,601.50 in attorney's fees in 
connection with the Court's entry of its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
As of the December 10, 1993, the total judgment awarded is: 
$947.44 (principal) + (323.06 + 476.49 (int. on prin. bal)) 
+ 2827.40 (44.25 + 2783.15)(original costs and fees) 
+ 948.14 (int. on costs and fees from 2/15/91) 
+ 3875.00 (add'l fees awarded on 7/21/91) 
+ 1148.26 (int. on add'l fees awarded from 7/21/91) 
+ 1601.50 (add'l fees awarded on 12/16/92) 
+ 192.18 (int. on add'l fees awarded from 12/16/92): 
For a total of $12,339.47 on the main judgment; which amount is 
increasing at the rate of $3.23 per day in interest from December 
10, 1993 plus any additional costs and fees incurred in collection 
hereof. 
Plus $65.86 + 55.66 (interest), for a total due from Russell 
Sorenson separately of $121.52; which amount is increasing at the 
rate of $.031 per day in interest. 
WHICH JUDGMENTS SAMUEL KING WAS ALSO ORDERED TO PAY, AS 
SURETY, in the orders dated July 21, 1991 and December 16, 1992. 
DATED the 10th day of December, 1993. 
Bri^ iiyW. Steffp 
Attorney for 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of December, 1993, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Samuel King Neil Sorenson Construction 
King, Meservy & Dent Russell Sorenson 
301 Gump & Ayers Building 2965 So. 2700 East 
2120 South 1300 East Salt Lake City, Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
-fr j^p 
FILED 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092)
 / Q 1 0 | | n 
Attorney at Law 3l nUb / flfl H 31 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 CLERK 0F THE CIRCUIT COURT 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 SALT LAKE DIVISION 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
V S . J 
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, J 
RUSSELL SORENSEN, and CINDY CAIN, \ 
Defendants, i 
: Notice of Judgment 
.y' 
i CpfCl No. 903008156 
: / Judge Maurice D. Jones 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that judgment was entered on February 15, 
1991, in favor, of the plaintiff and against defendants Neil 
Sorensen Construction and Russell Sorensen, jointly and severally, 
for the following: 
1. $947.44 in principal; 
2. Interest on said principal amount at 18% per annum from 
April 4, 1989 until February 26, 1991 in the amount of $323.06; 
plus interest on said principal amount at 18% per annum thereafter 
until paid in full; 
3. Costs of $44.25 and attorney's fees of $2783.15; plus 
any additional attorney's fees incurred in collecting this judgment 
upon motion supported by counsel's affidavit; 
4. With interest on the amounts in item 3 at 12% from the 
date of judgment until paid in full. 
And a separate judgment against Russell Sorensen for $65.86 
plus interest thereon at 18% from March 23, 1989 until paid in 
full. 
AND that this Judgment was increased on June 21, 1991, by 
the award of an additional $3,875.00 in attorney's fees in 
connection with the Court's denial of defendants' motions to set 
aside summary judgment. 
As of the August 6, 1991, the total judgment awarded is: 
$947.44 (principal) + (323.06 + 76.22 (int. on prin. bal) 
+ 2827.40 (44.25 + 2783.15)(original costs and fees) 
+ 151.69 (int. on costs and fees from 2/15/91) 
+ 3875.00 (addfl fees awarded on 7/21/91) 
+ 20.64 (int. on add'l fees awarded from 7/21/91: 
For a total of $8f221.45 on the main judgment; which amount is 
increasing at the rate of $2.70 per day in interest plus any 
additional costs and fees incurred in collection hereof. 
Plus $65.86 + 39.97 (interest), for a total due from Russell 
Sorenson separately of $105.83; which amount is increasing at the 
rate of $.031 per day in interest. 
DATED the &^ day of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
__, I hereby certify that on the fc? day of rif^h0^ r 
/tyfrf , I caused a true and correct copy of the\ foregoing 
instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, addressed "ks-^ follows: 
Samuel King Neil Sorenson Construction 
King, Meservy & Dent Russell Sorenson 
301 Gump & Ayers Building 2965 So, 2700 East 
2120 South 1300 East Salt Lake City, Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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K I N G . M E S E R V Y & F E U E S H E L M 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
AN A S S O C I A T I O N O F SOLE P R A C T I T I O N E R S 
SAMUCL KING 301 GUMP £. AYERS BUILDING 
JAY A MESERVY 
KENT r E U E R H E L H 2 , 2 ° S ° U ™ , 3 ° ° C A S T 
ERIC P M A R T M A N SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 6A106 
(SOI) 4 6 6 - 3 7 5 1 
J u l y 20, 1989 
Main Street Lighting 
179 East Main Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Attention: Jill 
Re: Neil Sorensen Construction - George Stavros 
Gentlemen: 
This letter is written to detail what Sorensen Construction is 
going to do. 
You supplied the tracX lighting fixtures for the George Stavros' 
home in Bountiful, Utah. 
The electrical subcontractor advised Sorensen that three of the 
lights were defective due to manufacturing defects. This was 
over six months ago. 
Since then, Sorensen has tried hard through contact with you to 
get the lights replaced with ones that work. You have been 
unable to obtain new fixtures from the manufacturer. You advised 
Sorensen that the manufacturer is Traclights and that its local 
representative is Mike McClellan. For a number of months 
Sorensen has attempted to reach Mr. McClellan. He has not 
responded to their calls. They did speak to his wife who said 
that she would have Traclights send new fixtures. To date, these 
have never been received. 
The result is that the Stavros home is complete and occupied by 
Mr. Stavros and his family. The accounts of the Stavros' job are 
settled except that Stavros refuses to pay the electrical 
subcontractor $3,600, and won't pay him until the three defective 
fixtures have been replaced. 
This can't go on. That job has to be closed, the account settled 
with Stavros and the electrical subcontractor paid. All of 
Sorensen's efforts to get the matter resolved have failed. 
Main Street Lighting 
July 20, 1989 
Page 2 
Accordingly, the Sorensen's are obligated to you for $947.44 for 
fixtures supplied on the Jerris and Cindy Cain property at 679 
Birchbrook Circle, Salt Lake City. As Sorensen has previously 
advised you verbally, they will now have the electrician remove 
the fixtures from the Stavros job supplied by you and return 
these to you. The electrician will put in new fixtures obtained 
from another source. The cost of obtaining and installing the 
new fixtures will be as billed by the electrician. Sorensen will 
make no profit. That cost, though, will be deducted from the 
money Sorensen owes you on the Cain job. With that done, the 
Stavros job can be closed out and the electrician paid. 
Sorensen has enjoyed doing business with you in the past and 
hopes to do business with you in the future. Nevertheless, the 
refusal of your manufacturer to back you up as its representative 
by supplying appropriate new fixtures can't be accepted and this 
step is necessary. As soon as the work is done, you will receive 
(1) your defective fixtures, (2) an accounting showing the cost 
of obtaining and installing the new fixtures, and (3) Sorensen's 
payment to you for the balance left, if any, from the Cain job. 
At the time of the delivery of that check, Sorensen will expect a 
lien release from ycu for your work on the Cain property. 















JVJEfi. f#. SO&ENSEN 
T I a N> a /w 
2965 SOl/fH 2700 E4ST SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84109 • (801) 485-9336 
August 10 , 1989 
Main Street Lighting 
179 E. Main Street 
Sandy Utah 84070 
Attention: Jill 
Gentleman: 
This letter is written as a follow up to our previous 
letter and phone calls. 
The defective track lights were replaced at a cost to 
Sorensen Construction of $1375.00. Deducting the $947.44 
owed on Cains project leaves you owing a balance of $427.56 
We are not asking for any reinbursement of this money just 
that this matter is ended. 
The fixtures are at our Office. We expect you to pick them 
up or We will dispose of them. 
Russ Sorensen 
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RING, M E S E R V Y & FETJERHELM 
A T T O R N C Y S A T LAW 
AN A S S O C I A T I O N O P SOLE P R A C T I T I O N E R S 
3 0 I OUMP & AYCRS BUILOINO 
2120 SOUTH 1300 CAST 
SAXX LAXE CITY, UTAH 6 4 1 0 6 
(son 4>ae-37Si 
August 17, 1990 
Mr. Brian Steffensen 
Attorney at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Re: Ivie v. Sorenson 
Dear Mr. Steffensen: 
Enclosed is a copy of the Answer together with the supporting 
documents. 
As you can tell from the July, 1989, letter, I was involved in 
this matter last yeair. I think Sorenson's answer and supporting 
documents are entirely bona fide* Sorenson really did have to 
pay the $1,300 to Heritage to correct what was done by Main 
Street. 
The Stavros house was complete except fox the wiring. Stavros 
was threatening to sue Sorenson if he didn't get that done. 
Sorenson did his best to have Main Street do it and only hired 
the work out to somebody else, at substantial expense to 
Sorenson, because it was the only way Sorenson had of dealing 
with the problem. 
Will Ivie agree to be responsible for the setoff? Will I have to 
bring Main Street in as a third-party defendant? 
We can obviously try a rather complicated case. Based on the 
supporting documents that r have, Ivie's chance of recovery is 
remote ^  
Sorenson has instructed me to file an appropriate counterclaim or 
third party complaint, if the matter isn't brought to a head 
promptly. 
As a solution, enclosed is voluntary dismissal with prejudice of 
all claims of all parties. This protects Main Street as well as 
Sorenson. Please check this with your clients. If you approve, 
return it to me within ten days signed by you. I will submit it 
to the court for -entry and dismissal of the case. 
SAMUEL KINO 
JAY A. MESERVY 
KCNT FEUGRMCLM 
CRIC R MARTMAN 
Brian Steffensen 
August 17 1QQn 
Page 2 
If you want'to talk to me, I will be glad to give you any 







BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092) 
Attorney at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite „ 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84106 ...l£ CmCU\T COUf-
Telephone: (801 ) 273-39 6 ^ s | j | | g^E 0WIS10H 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE 
irviF I'M pnTiRiir SFRVTTE, 
L'Luiut iff, 
vs. 
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, 




Civi 1 No^ . 903008156 
Judge Paul Grant 
In this action, the defendant(s) Cindy Cain, having been 
regularly served with process, and having failed to appear and 
answer the plaintiff's complaint on file herein, and the time 
allowed for law for answering having expired, and the default of 
said defendant in the premises having been duly entered according 
to law, now upon the application of said plaintiff to the above-
entitled court, judgment is hereby entered against said defendants 
Cindy Cain, pursuant to the prayer of the complaint herein* • 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law,, and by reason of the 
aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that said plaintiff 
does recover from defendant(s) Cindy Cain the following sums: 
The principal amount of $947.44; 
2. Interest on the principal amount at the annual perceuLdije 
rate of 10% from April 4, 1989 until the date of judgment; 
Attorney's fees of <5?7^^ i fc) } 
together with interest on all of the about il I  \\o i ,il i uf l?1", 
the date of judgment until paid in full, 
f i" i nil 
Iao 
rt W / H S 7 R t .
 t;^'H7/N(; 
Hi)'- , in tin <; f* "^ 
f SCLi; 7o J C HORK-DESCRlt \ 10H1 
RUSSELL SOREHSLH RUSS SOREHSOH 
2965 SOUTH 27 0 0 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84 109 
0ME_.„_SAL.ESflEN OR(|ERJ_QROERiOAIE_ S J U M l i 
03/23/89 .45 62Ji I 
I1R'D_SHIP'D BKOR'D ITE!tt/JOBt DESCRIPTION 
1 1 0 KU 24 
2 2 0 DAYBR1GHI 
TERMS. («VC_.I 
.NEJ 62.J1 
UNIT PRICE AMOUNT 
EA 54.000 54.00 
EA 3.990 7.98 
NON-UI TAXABLE BALES TAI FREIGHT MJISC 1NVC - TOTAL 
-.00 . 6 1,98 1788 ~00~] . .00 " 65 Jb~ 
